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www.wildwest.gov: The Impact of the Internet on 
State Power to Enforce the Law 
Terrence Berg∗ 
The monumental expansion of the Internet1 over the past ten 
years has revolutionized the mainstream means of communications 
and interpersonal relations throughout the world. Through this 
global network of interconnected computers, all manner of data, 
communications, commerce, and imagery—from the most obscure 
scintilla of trivia, to the darkest manifestation of evil, to the most 
sublime works of art, literature, and science—are suddenly and im-
mediately accessible everywhere, to everyone, all at once. In terms of 
the human ability to interact globally and instantaneously, this is a 
whole new world.2 For those charged with enforcing state law, 
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2000, Mr. Berg served as the Computer Crime Fellow for the National Association of Attor-
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and other technology-related issues of law. The author wishes to thank Aaron Pruss, a law stu-
dent at Wayne State University School of Law and law clerk for the Michigan Department of 
the Attorney General, and Brian Zwit, formerly Chief Counsel for Science and Technology of 
NAAG, for their research assistance and editorial comments, and also the attorneys of CCIPS 
for their support, encouragement, and critique of this article. 
 1. The Internet has been defined as “the largest computer network in the world,” 
VALERIE QUERCIA, INTERNET IN A NUTSHELL 4 (1997), and also as “a global network of 
computers, interconnected so they can exchange information,” NED SNELL, INTERNET CHEAT 
SHEET 2 (1999). For a more descriptive definition, Peter J. Denning has explained: 
The Internet has become an information superhighway, an enormous digital library, 
a nervous system connecting scientists and their instruments worldwide, an elec-
tronic marketplace for commerce, a worldwide corporate and individual identity 
projector, a nurturing ground for relationships, a multimedia entertainment center, 
a virtual university, a breeding ground for conspiracies, and a challenge to the power 
of governments. It is evolving at the intersection of science, engineering, business, 
libraries, art, entertainment, education, and politics. It is a space where the best and 
worst of humanity appear. 
Peter J. Denning, The Internet After Thirty Years, in INTERNET BESIEGED 15, 15 (Dorothy E. 
Denning & Peter J. Denning eds., 1998). 
 2. United States Attorney Janet Reno stated: 
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whether civil or criminal, this new world of cyberspace has some-
times been compared to the “wild, wild west” without a sheriff.3 The 
metaphor is apt in the sense that, like the American frontier, the ex-
panse of the Internet is immense and the reach of law enforcement in 
cyberspace is uncertain. This article will explore several significant 
ways in which the advent of the World Wide Web and the main-
streaming of the Internet have impacted the ability of the states to 
carry out their obligations to protect their citizens by enforcing their 
laws. In particular, this article will address three areas in which the 
states’ law enforcement function faces new challenges as a result of 
the increasing use of the Internet by society. 
First, by greatly increasing the ease by which a state’s consumers 
may interact with out-of-state residents in commercial and personal 
transactions, the Internet increases the likelihood that states will 
need to bring civil enforcement actions against nonresidents. Bring-
ing civil actions against nonresidents raises issues of in personam ju-
risdiction. Consequently, the first, and most extensive, topic that will 
be discussed is the impact of the Internet on a state’s ability to exer-
cise personal jurisdiction over nonresidents in civil enforcement ac-
tions. Part I will review the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on per-
sonal jurisdiction, discuss the federal and state cases which have 
 
[W]e are facing a moment in history where the decisions we make to confront the 
challenges of high technology and law enforcement are absolutely critical. These de-
cisions will decisively shape our abilities to cope with crime for all time. The Internet 
and the revolution in information technology have transformed the world. The 
monumental advances in computer software technology over the last ten years, 
combined with the explosive growth of the Internet, have changed the world for-
ever. 
Attorney General Janet Reno, Remarks to the National Association of Attorneys General, at the 
Dinkelspiel Auditorium on Stanford University (Jan. 10, 2000) <http://www.cybercrime.gov/ 
agnaag.htm> [hereinafter “Reno Remarks of January 10, 2000”]. 
 3. The analogy is a common one, as mentioned by Professor Denning in her Preface to 
Internet Besieged: 
Yet the Internet is a risky place to conduct business or store assets. . . . Analogies to 
the Old American West, populated by unruly cowboys and a shoot-first-and-ask-
later mentality are more appropriate than the coiners of the phrase “electronic fron-
tier” ever imagined. Many law-abiding citizens, who simply want to conduct their 
business in peace, are demanding that the marshal come to cyberspace. 
Dorothy E. Denning, Preface to INTERNET BESIEGED, supra note 1, at vii, vii. The phrase was 
also recently used by the Chief of Police in Farmington, Michigan, who told a reporter asking 
him about a suspect who had purchased assault rifle parts over the Internet: “It is like the Old 
West, only with no sheriff in town. You’ve got sexual predators, violent people buying guns. 
We need to come up with some safeguards.” See Felon’s Gun Charges Show Net Loophole, DET. 
FREE PRESS  (Feb. 23, 2000) <http://www.freepress.com>. 
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addressed personal jurisdiction in the context of the Internet, and 
suggest that the impact of the Internet on society will eventually 
cause some loosening of the standards necessary to establish personal 
jurisdiction.4 
Second, the Internet also offers criminals a huge and easy-to-
reach pool of potential victims; so state law enforcement authorities 
will increasingly need to respond to cybercrimes that are perpetrated 
and located outside the boundaries of territorial jurisdiction. To re-
spond to these crimes, state prosecutors will either need to pursue 
cases against out-of-state residents or secure the assistance of sister 
states in prosecuting the offenders. Part II of the article will consider 
some of the case law relating to criminal prosecutions involving ex-
traterritorial conduct and will apply the rules of these cases in the 
context of Internet-related crimes. 
Third, in addition to presenting challenges to state law enforce-
ment in the context of both civil and criminal jurisdiction, the Inter-
net also creates new investigative challenges for state authorities. For 
example, the Internet can offer wrongdoers a veil of anonymity due 
to difficulties in tracing the source of electronic connections. More-
over, the architecture of the Internet permits Internet Service Pro-
viders (“ISPs”) to provide services and store electronic data for per-
sons located anywhere in the world. To conduct investigations in this 
environment, state investigators need to gather electronic evidence 
located in other jurisdictions. Thus, Part III will discuss a state’s au-
thority to pursue transborder investigations, identify the problems 
faced by states in this area, and suggest several solutions. 
In each of these three categories, this article will suggest a num-
ber of proposals to enhance the state’s ability to continue its tradi-
tional role of protecting its citizens in the online world. 
 
 
 4. To “cut to the quick” on the question of personal jurisdiction in the context of 
commerce over the Internet, the emerging majority rule favors a “sliding scale” approach, ac-
cording to which mere passive advertising over the Internet will not be considered sufficient 
minimum contacts to confer jurisdiction, advertising plus interactivity of a web site will fall in a 
middle ground, and advertising plus interactivity, plus other real world commercial contacts 
with the forum state will be found to be sufficient contacts to support personal jurisdiction. See 
GTE New Media Servs., Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Zippo 
Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997). This article will at-
tempt to trace the development of this standard from the classic Supreme Court personal juris-
diction cases through the more recent Internet cases. 
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I. PERSONAL JURISDICTION OVER NON-RESIDENTS IN STATE CIVIL 
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 
As in civil actions brought by private parties, the plaintiff in state 
enforcement actions bears the burden of pleading and proving that 
the court has the power to exercise jurisdiction over the person of 
the defendant. In the cases in which the defendant is an operator of a 
web site hosted on a server connected to the Internet,5 the odds are 
that the defendant will be physically located in another jurisdiction. 
For this reason, states considering an activist approach to enforce-
ment actions that involve Internet targets will need to review the ba-
sic Supreme Court jurisprudence pertaining to in personam jurisdic-
tion. Reported decisions involving the Internet, which will be 
discussed in the following section, cast a look back at the seminal 
Supreme Court decisions of International Shoe v. Washington,6 
Shaffer v. Heitner,7 World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson,8 Helicopteros 
Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall,9 Burger King v. Rudzewicz,10 and 
several other important cases,11 in order to define the standards to 
apply in cases in which the nonresident being sued has Internet-
related connections to the forum state. 
 
 
 
 
 5. The World Wide Web is a set of Internet computers and services that provides an 
easy-to-use system for finding information and moving among resources. A server is a net-
worked computer that serves a particular type of information or performs a particular function. 
A web site is a collection of World Wide Web documents, typically all on the same server, usu-
ally consisting of a home page (the main, or top, page that is displayed at the web site) and 
several related pages accessed from it. A site may contain any number of pages, from one page 
to thousands of interlinked pages and other files. A web page is a document stored on a web 
server, typically in the file format HTML (.htm or .html). Web pages are retrieved from servers 
and displayed by web browsers. A web browser is a software tool that is used to interact with a 
web server. SNELL, supra note 1, at 341–47 (adapted from glossary of terms). 
 6. International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
 7. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
 8. World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
 9. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984). 
 10. Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
 11. Some of the other key Supreme Court cases are McGee v. International Life Insur-
ance, 355 U.S. 220 (1957); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); Kulko v. Superior 
Court, 436 U.S. 84, (1978); Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); 
and Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990). 
1BER-FIN.DOC 12/9/00  1:29 PM 
1305] www.wildwest.gov 
 1309 
A. United States Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Personal 
Jurisdiction 
In International Shoe v. Washington, the Supreme Court consid-
ered a suit by Washington State to recover unpaid contributions to 
the State unemployment compensation fund from the International 
Shoe Corporation based on three years’ worth of shoe sales within 
the State. International Shoe had no office located in the State but it 
had paid salesmen working in the State.12 The Court noted that, his-
torically, a person’s physical presence within the territorial jurisdic-
tion of a court was a prerequisite to the court’s ability to render 
judgments binding on that person.13 Recognizing this was no longer 
the law, the Court explained that 
due process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a 
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the 
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the 
maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice.”14 
Because the “minimum contacts” standard of International Shoe, 
adopted in 1945, remains the law today, it is useful to examine care-
fully the contours of this standard. By minimum contacts, the Inter-
national Shoe Court referred to the 
activities of the corporation’s agent within the state which courts 
will deem to be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process. . . . 
[S]uch contacts of the corporation with the state of the forum as 
make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system of govern-
ment, to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which 
is brought there.15 
After laying out this standard, the International Shoe Court then 
distinguished three different factual scenarios that could allow an as-
sertion of jurisdiction over a nonresident. In the first scenario, which 
the Court described almost as a constructive form of physical pres-
 
 12. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 313. 
 13. Id. at 316 (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877)). 
 14. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
 15. Id. at 317 (emphasis added). The Court made it clear that, in determining whether 
it would be “reasonable” to require the nonresident corporation to defend the lawsuit, it 
would be relevant to consider an “estimate of inconveniences” resulting from a trial away from 
home. Id. at 316–17. 
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ence, “the activities of the [nonresident] corporation [in the forum 
state] have not only been continuous and systematic, but also give rise 
to the liabilities sued on.”16 In this fact pattern, in which (1) the non-
resident has continuous and systematic activities in the forum state, 
and (2) the activities themselves give rise to the lawsuit, the Court 
concludes that it would be reasonable to permit the exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction over the nonresident.17 The second scenario dis-
cussed is one in which the “continuous corporate operations within a 
state were thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify 
suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely dis-
tinct from those activities.”18 The third factual situation highlighted 
by the Court was where the nonresident corporation commits “some 
single or occasional acts” imposing liability on it which, “because of 
their nature and quality and the circumstances of their commission, 
may be deemed sufficient to render the corporation liable to suit.”19 
Having sketched out the possible factual scenarios, (1) continu-
ous and systematic contacts if the suit arises out of those contacts 
(specific jurisdiction), (2) substantial contacts if the suit does not 
arise out of those contacts (general jurisdiction), and (3) occasional 
contact if the suit arises out of that contact (specific jurisdiction), 
Chief Justice Stone then explained that whether a particular exercise 
of personal jurisdiction will meet the requirements of due process 
would depend on a number of factors that are not “mechanical nor 
 
 16. Id. at 317 (emphasis added). 
 17. The Supreme Court later used the term “specific jurisdiction” to describe the situa-
tion where “a state exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit arising out of or 
related to the defendant’s contact to the forum . . . .” See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom-
bia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984). 
 18. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318. This second scenario, involving the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident who has substantial contacts with a forum, but who is 
being sued on a cause of action that does not arise from or relate to the activities of the non-
resident in the forum, is referred to in subsequent Supreme Court opinions as “general juris-
diction.” See Helicopteros Nacionales, 466 U.S. at 415 n.9. In Helicopteros Nacionales, the Su-
preme Court did not approve of an attempt by the Texas courts to assert general jurisdiction 
over a Colombian corporation where the lawsuit pertained to an accident that occurred outside 
the United States and the company did not have significant contacts with Texas. Id. at 418. An 
example of the Supreme Court’s finding appropriate a state’s exercise of such general jurisdic-
tion is Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) (allowing exercise of 
Ohio personal jurisdiction over a Philippine company which had substantial contacts with 
Ohio, although the lawsuit related to stock ownership and damages issues that did not relate to 
any of the activities conducted in Ohio). 
 19. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318. 
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quantitative.”20 In particular, the Court indicated that the “quality 
and nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly admini-
stration of the laws” needed to be considered, along with the extent 
to which the nonresident corporation exercised the privilege of do-
ing business within the forum and enjoyed the benefits and protec-
tions of the laws of the forum.21 
In reaching its holding, the International Shoe Court summa-
rized the kinds of contacts that the nonresident corporation had with 
Washington State, then concluded that such contacts were sufficient 
“to make it reasonable and just according to our traditional concep-
tion of fair play and substantial justice to permit the state to enforce 
the obligations which the appellant has incurred there.”22 Since In-
ternational Shoe, the Supreme Court has continued to apply the 
“minimum contacts” standard and has fleshed out the meaning of 
the terms “reasonableness” and “traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.”23 
A review of the Supreme Court jurisprudence following Interna-
tional Shoe reveals several additional factors that have been consid-
ered significant in determining whether an exercise of personal juris-
diction is reasonable and consistent with traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice. In McGee v. International Life Insurance 
Co., the Court found several contacts between the nonresident in-
surance company and the forum state of California: the insurance 
contract was delivered there and the premiums were mailed from 
there. The Court, however, focused on the facts that the lawsuit 
 
 20. Id. at 319. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 320. 
 23. McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222–23 (1951). In fleshing out these 
standards since 1945, the Supreme Court has several times noted that historical changes in the 
nation’s economy were responsible for an expanding notion of personal jurisdiction. Just six 
years after International Shoe, Justice Black observed in McGee: 
Looking back over this long history of litigation a trend is clearly discernible toward 
expanding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and 
other nonresidents. In part this is attributable to the fundamental transformation of 
our national economy over the years. Today many commercial transactions touch 
two or more states and may involve parties separated by the full continent. With this 
increasing nationalization of commerce has come a great increase in the amount of 
business conducted by mail across state lines. At the same time modern transporta-
tion and communication have made it much less burdensome for a party sued to de-
fend himself in a State where he engages in economic activity. 
Id. at 222–23. 
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arose out of the contacts and that the forum state had passed a law 
that specifically provided procedures intended to allow state citizens 
to sue nonresident insurance companies. The Court gave consider-
able weight to the fact that California had “a manifest interest in 
providing effective means of redress for its residents when their in-
surers refuse to pay claims.”24 
Faced with a claim which did not arise out of any contact with 
the forum in Hanson v. Denckla, and a record which showed very 
few contacts between a Delaware trust and trustee and the State of 
Florida, Chief Justice Warren found invalid an exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over the trustee.25 In particular, in Hanson the Court 
emphasized that although the application of the minimum contacts 
rule would vary with the quality and nature of each defendant’s ac-
tivity, “it is essential in each case that there be some act by which the 
defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting ac-
tivities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protec-
tions of its laws.”26 
Similarly, in Shaffer v. Heitner,27 although the Court held that all 
assertions of state court jurisdiction should be evaluated under the 
International Shoe minimum contacts test, it nevertheless found that 
the test was not met when the plaintiffs sequestered stock belonging 
to nonresident defendants, but the property at issue was not the sub-
ject matter of the litigation and the cause of action was not related to 
the property.28 The Court found insufficient contacts between the 
defendants and Delaware and no proof that the defendants had 
“purposefully avail[ed themselves] of the privilege of conducting ac-
tivities within the forum state” where the defendants simply “had 
nothing to do with the State of Delaware [and] . . . no reason to ex-
pect to be haled before a Delaware court.”29 In Hanson and Shaffer, 
the Supreme Court made it clear that if a nonresident defendant by 
 
 24. Id. at 223. 
 25. 357 U.S. 235, 252–54 (1958). The Court again noted in Hanson the role of “tech-
nological progress . . . [which] increased the flow of commerce between the States . . . [and] 
progress in communications and transportation” in causing an evolution away from the “rigid 
rule of Pennoyer v. Neff,” but also warned that “it is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds 
the eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of state courts.” Id. at 250–
51. 
 26. Id. at 253. 
 27. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
 28. See id. at 212–13. 
 29. Id. at 216 (citing Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253). 
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his conduct in connection with the forum state, “purposely avails 
himself” of the privileges and protections of the forum, and if the 
lawsuit arises out of or relates to the conduct in the forum, then re-
quiring the defendant to defend an action in the forum would be 
“reasonable,” and would not offend “traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice” as required under International Shoe.30 
The Supreme Court further refined the “purposeful availment” 
factor in the key decision of World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson.31 Finding that the defendants conducted “no activity what-
soever in Oklahoma . . . no sales and . . . no services,” and that 
“[t]hey avail[ed] themselves of none of the privileges and benefits of 
Oklahoma law[,]” soliciting “no business there either through sales-
persons or through advertising reasonably calculated to reach the 
State[,]” the Court concluded that jurisdiction was being sought 
based on “one, isolated occurrence, and whatever inferences can be 
drawn therefrom.”32 Significantly, the Court distinguished between 
“foreseeability” alone that a party could be sued in a foreign jurisdic-
tion and a party’s “conduct and connection with the forum state” 
such that he should “reasonably anticipate being haled into court 
there.”33 “[A] corporation [that] ‘purposefully avails itself of the 
privilege of conducting activities within the forum state’” should rea-
sonably anticipate being sued there.34 A corporation’s efforts to “di-
rectly or indirectly” serve markets in other states and to deliver its 
goods into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they 
will be purchased by consumers in the forum state, would be suffi-
cient proof of purposeful availment to allow jurisdiction. 
 
 30. The “purposeful availment” factor was again considered significant by the Supreme 
Court in Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 94 (1978) (denying personal jurisdiction where 
a nonresident divorced father had few contacts with California other than two short visits 18 
years earlier, agreeing in a separation agreement to allow his children to live part-time with 
their mother there, and later permitting his children to move there). The Court weighed Cali-
fornia’s argument of its substantial state interest in protecting resident children and facilitating 
child support actions on behalf of those children, but those interests did not outweigh the de-
fendant’s lack of contacts with the forum. Id. at 100–01. 
 31. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). The case involved a products-liability action for damages aris-
ing from an auto accident in Oklahoma. Plaintiff sought to recover for personal injuries against 
the New York auto dealership and the regional distributor (World-Wide Volkswagen), as well 
as the manufacturers of the vehicle. The dealership and the regional distributor objected claim-
ing a lack of minimum contacts with Oklahoma. Id. at 288–89. 
 32. Id. at 295. 
 33. Id. at 297. 
 34. Id. at 297–98 (citing Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253). 
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In addition to developing the purposeful availment standard, the 
Court in World-Wide Volkswagen catalogued a number of factors 
that can be considered in determining whether the personal jurisdic-
tion would be consistent with “reasonableness,” “fairness,” and 
“substantial justice.”35 The factors relevant to a determination of rea-
sonableness include: the burden on the defendant, the forum state’s 
interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff’s interest in obtain-
ing convenient and effective relief, the interstate judicial system’s in-
terest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies, and 
the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental 
substantive social policies.36 The Court also recognized that, inde-
pendent of the convenience of the parties and the interests of the fo-
rum, “the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument of interstate 
federalism, may sometimes act to divest a State of its power to render 
a valid judgment.”37 
World-Wide Volkswagen involved an attempt to exercise “specific 
jurisdiction;” that is, jurisdiction asserted in a case in which the 
claims (product liability/personal injury) arose out of the contact 
with the forum state (the auto accident occurring in Oklahoma). The 
lack of minimum contacts prevented jurisdiction. In Helicopteros Na-
cionales de Colombia v. Hall, the Supreme Court addressed a case in-
volving “general jurisdiction,” where the claim (wrongful death ac-
tion) did not arise out of or relate to any contact with the forum; 
rather the claim was related to a helicopter crash that occurred in 
Peru.38 The Court made it clear in Helicopteros Nacionales that in or-
der for a state court to exercise general jurisdiction over a nonresi-
dent (that is, jurisdiction on a claim which does not arise from or re-
late to any contact with the forum), there must be a showing that 
the defendant had “continuous and systematic general business con-
tacts” with the forum.39 Even though the nonresident defendant had 
some continuing contacts with Texas, including the purchase of four 
million dollars worth of helicopters from Bell Helicopter over a 
seven-year period, such contacts were not found to be sufficiently 
 
 35. Id. at 292. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 294 (citing Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251). 
 38. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984). The Court 
defined “specific jurisdiction” and “general jurisdiction” in the footnotes. See id. at 414 n.8, 
415 n.9. 
 39. Id. at 416. 
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“continuous and systematic” to allow the exercise of jurisdiction over 
a non-forum-related claim.40 
The Court next addressed a case of specific jurisdiction in Burger 
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, which involved Burger King’s suit for 
trademark infringement and enforcement of the terms of a franchise 
agreement against a Michigan franchisee.41 Florida’s long-arm statute 
permitted state jurisdiction over a nonresident if the cause of action 
arose from breach of a contract to be performed in Florida. The 
Burger King Court found that since the defendant franchisee had 
“‘purposefully directed’ his activities at residents of the forum” state, 
and since the litigation arose out of or related to those activities, the 
exercise of jurisdiction over the nonresident was proper.42 However, 
Justice Brennan also noted that the existence of minimum contacts 
and “purposeful availment” would still need to be “considered in 
light of other factors to determine whether the assertion of personal 
jurisdiction would comport with ‘fair play and substantial justice,’” 
and concluded that “minimum requirements inherent in the concept 
of ‘fair play and substantial justice’ may defeat the reasonableness of 
jurisdiction even if the defendant has purposefully engaged in forum 
activities.”43 In that case, however, the Court concluded that the de-
fendant had availed himself of Florida’s laws, and had not shown that 
the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable.44 
The most recent examples of Supreme Court jurisprudence in 
the area of personal jurisdiction evince a divided Court. Both Asahi 
Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court,45 and Burnham v. Superior 
Court,46 are opinions in which no majority could agree on all the 
segments of a single opinion. In Asahi Metal Industry, the Court ad-
 
 40. Id. at 420 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In dissent, Justice Brennan pointed out that the 
majority opinion did not address the issue of whether by its conduct, the defendant Helicol 
had “purposefully availed itself of the benefits and obligations of the forum.” Id. (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
 41. 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
 42. Id. at 472. The franchisee had never actually been physically present in Florida. 
Nevertheless, the Court found that the negotiations with the Florida corporation, the contract 
itself, and the fact that the defendant’s breach of the contract caused “foreseeable injuries to 
the corporation in Florida” were sufficient contacts to make it reasonable that the franchisee 
should be called to account in Florida. Id. at 479–80. 
 43. Id. at 476–78 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 
292 (1980)). 
 44. Id. at 487. 
 45. 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
 46. 495 U.S. 604 (1990). 
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dressed the question of whether “mere awareness” on the part of the 
nonresident corporation that its manufactured component would 
reach the forum state through the stream of commerce constituted 
adequate “minimum contacts.”47 The Court was divided over 
whether a corporation’s placing of its goods in the stream of com-
merce with the knowledge that its products would eventually arrive 
in the forum was sufficient to meet the “purposeful availment” test. 
However, eight Justices agreed that under the facts of that case the 
exercise of jurisdiction over a Japanese corporation which had indi-
rect contacts with California would be unreasonable when its con-
tacts with the forum were weighed against the burden on the defen-
dant to defend in such a distant forum and the inconvenience of a 
foreign legal system.48 
In Burnham v. Superior Court, a divorce case, all nine Justices 
agreed, but in four separate opinions, that personal service of process 
on a nonresident who is temporarily physically present in the forum 
will be sufficient to allow an exercise of personal jurisdiction.49 The 
holding of Burnham makes it clear that, even for suits which do not 
arise out of contacts with the forum, and in which the defendant has 
no minimum contacts with the forum, personal jurisdiction may nev-
ertheless be asserted if the defendant is physically within the territory 
of the forum and is personally served with process. Because Burnham 
is a general jurisdiction case, but one in which the Court allowed ju-
risdiction in the absence of any “continuous and systematic” contacts 
with the forum state, it differs from the Court’s other general juris-
diction decisions which have insisted on such contacts.50 Although 
this review of Supreme Court jurisprudence does not presage any 
 
 47. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 105. The Court explained: “Considering the international con-
text, the heavy burden on the alien defendant, and the slight interests of the plaintiff and the 
forum State, the exercise of personal jurisdiction by a California court over Asahi in this in-
stance would be unreasonable and unfair.” Id. at 116. 
 48. Id. at 113. 
 49. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 622. Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion concluded that personal 
service of process within the territory of the forum was part of the “traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice” which existed at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and consequently it met that standard. Justice Brennan’s concurrence agreed 
with the conclusion that personal service within the forum was consistent with due process, but 
for the reason that a person’s visiting a state is a form of purposeful availment, not because the 
practice of personal service was in existence at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
 50. See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Per-
kins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
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particular approach that might apply in Internet-related cases, it does 
show that the Court’s understanding of “fairness” in the context of 
jurisdiction has evolved in response to economic and sociological 
changes.51 A table provided as an appendix at the end of the article 
attempts to categorize the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s limitations on state courts’ exercise of 
personal jurisdiction. 
B. Federal Cases Applying Personal Jurisdiction Jurisprudence to 
Internet-Related Conduct 
Federal Circuit Courts of Appeal have already issued eight opin-
ions attempting to apply the standards of personal jurisdiction set 
out in International Shoe and its progeny in litigation arising in the 
context of business relationships conducted through the Internet. Of 
the eight Circuit opinions, five have dismissed the complaints for 
lack of personal jurisdiction,52 while three have found personal juris-
diction in Internet-related disputes.53 
 
 51. See supra note 23; see infra note 206. 
 52. See GTE New Media Servs., Inc. v. BellSouth Corp., 199 F.3d 1343 (D.C. Cir. 
2000) (finding that mere accessibility of web site in forum was insufficient for minimum con-
tacts, but allowing additional discovery); Mink v. AAAA Dev., L.L.C., 190 F.3d 333, 336–37 
(5th Cir. 1999) (finding the accessibility of defendant’s web site in forum state insufficient 
where there was no evidence defendant conducted business over the Internet with forum resi-
dents when the web site did not allow online purchases); Soma Med. Int’l v. Standard Char-
tered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292 (10th Cir. 1999) (denying jurisdiction where British bank had pas-
sive web site that did little more than provide information, contacts were limited to managing 
plaintiff’s account, and there was no evidence of purposeful availment); Bensusan Restaurant 
Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25, 29 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that a web site for an out-of-state res-
taurant with the same name as a restaurant in the forum was not sufficient under the state 
long-arm statutes because the out-of-state defendant should not have reasonably expected to 
have consequences in forum); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419–20 (9th 
Cir. 1997) (denying personal jurisdiction in infringement case where a web page of an out-of-
state company using same name as plaintiff was “passive,” and there was no evidence defendant 
“deliberately directed his merchandising activity toward” forum residents or that any forum 
resident other than the plaintiff had even “hit” defendant’s site). 
 53. See Intercon, Inc. v. Bell Atlantic Internet Solutions, Inc., 205 F.3d 1244, 1248–49 
(10th Cir. 2000) (finding that nonresident phone company’s use of an Oklahoma Internet 
Service Provider’s mail servers for phone company’s customers constituted purposeful avail-
ment of the forum); Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1322 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(defendant’s conduct directing his activities toward the plaintiff and the forum state, resulting 
in harmful effects in the forum state, found sufficient for jurisdiction); CompuServe v. Patter-
son, 89 F.3d 1257, 1264 (6th Cir. 1996) (sufficient contacts found where defendant entered 
into contracts governed by forum law with plaintiff, who was based in the forum state, and 
where defendant sent software to defendant’s network located in the forum, and advertised on 
the plaintiff’s system). All three of these cases were “specific jurisdiction” cases, in that the 
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The D.C. Circuit recently reviewed the holdings of some of the 
other circuits in GTE New Media Services, Inc. v. BellSouth Corp.54 In 
GTE, the D.C. Circuit considered an antitrust case in which GTE 
New Media Services (“GTE”) contended that BellSouth Corp. and 
other companies were engaged in a conspiracy to dominate the 
Internet directories market in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan 
area by diverting Internet users from GTE’s website to the defen-
dants’ websites instead. The court of appeals held that, because Bell-
South’s only proven contacts with the District of Columbia were 
based on the fact that its residents could access defendants’ Internet 
Yellow Pages from within the city, there were insufficient minimum 
contacts to allow an exercise of personal jurisdiction.55 Although 
“mere accessibility” of a web site was not found sufficient, the appel-
late court did rule that GTE could conduct additional discovery in 
order to seek proof of sufficient contacts.56 
The GTE Court was concerned that plaintiff had only presented 
“bare allegations” and “conclusory statements” to the effect that the 
defendants’ activities had caused harm within the forum as a result of 
the defendants’ activities directed there.57 Because no purchases or 
sales or other exchange of money were taking place, the Court did 
not accept plaintiff’s argument that defendants were “transacting 
business” in the forum just because its residents were accessing the 
defendants’ Yellow Pages web sites.58 
Significantly, although the D.C. Circuit found that the plaintiff 
had failed to establish sufficient contacts to support an exercise of 
personal jurisdiction, it held that plaintiff was entitled to conduct 
“jurisdictional discovery” in order to supplement the record.59 In 
particular, the Court pointed out that the record did not show “for 
 
claim sued on arose out of the conduct that was directed at the forum. 
 54. 199 F.3d 1343 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
 55. Id. at 1350. The provision of the District of Columbia’s long-arm statute, D.C. 
Code Ann. § 13-423(a) (1981), which plaintiffs relied upon, allowed for jurisdiction where a 
defendant’s acts outside the forum caused a tortious injury inside the forum. Id. at 1347. 
 56. Id. at 1351. 
 57. Id. at 1349. 
 58. Id. at 1350. The D.C. Circuit disapproved of treating a case involving the Internet 
any differently from any other jurisdictional case, saying: “We do not believe that the advent of 
advanced technology, say, as with the Internet, should vitiate long-held and inviolate principles 
of federal court jurisdiction.” Id. 
 59. The Court cited to Crane v. Carr, 814 F.2d 758, 762 (D.C. Cir. 1987), as author-
ity for the allowance of jurisdictional discovery. 
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certain which defendants own and operate which web sites,” and 
that the plaintiff “may be able to present new facts to bolster the . . . 
theory of ‘substantial effects.’”60 
From the perspective of an enforcer of state laws, the federal 
cases that have found jurisdiction to be permissible are the most rele-
vant and useful. The following discussion analyzes the categories of 
factual predicates that have been found sufficient in the federal cases 
to allow the exercise of in personam jurisdiction in cases involving 
Internet-related contacts with a forum state. 
1. Internet contacts plus business transactions 
Because sufficient “real-world” minimum contacts with the fo-
rum by a nonresident can obviously occur in the absence of any web 
site or Internet-related contacts, cases which involve not only an 
Internet-based connection to the forum but also physical world con-
tacts have been held to permit the exercise of jurisdiction. The dis-
trict court in Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 
articulated a well-reasoned and often-followed analysis of Internet-
based jurisdiction cases. The Zippo court adopted a “sliding scale” 
approach under which “the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can 
be constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature 
and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the 
Internet.”61 
The district court identified a spectrum stretching from the case 
in which “a defendant clearly does business over the Internet”—
involving, for example, contracts with residents of the foreign juris-
diction and the knowing and repeated transmission of computer files 
over the Internet—to the case in which the defendant has merely 
posted the equivalent of advertising on the Internet—a “passive” 
web site that may be accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions. The 
“middle ground” was identified as cases containing an “interactive” 
web site, capable of allowing users to exchange information and data 
with the host computer. In this category of cases, the exercise of ju-
risdiction would depend on “examining the level of interactivity and 
commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the 
web site.”62 In the third category, which does not provide grounds 
 
 60. GTE New Media Servs., 199 F.3d at 1352. 
 61. 952 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997). 
 62. Id. at 1124. The district court pointed to CompuServe v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 
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for jurisdiction, the defendant has “simply posted information on an 
Internet web site which is accessible to users in foreign jurisdic-
tions.”63 In Zippo, the Court found sufficient contacts and purposeful 
availment because the defendant had contracts with seven service 
providers in Pennsylvania, had also sold 3000 passwords to Pennsyl-
vania residents, and had accepted their payments for its services.64 
At the district court level, a host of decisions have attempted to 
define the extent personal jurisdiction may be predicated on a defen-
dant’s web-site-related contacts with the forum. Numerous courts 
have held, consistent with Zippo, that a mere passive web site, even 
those that include a “1-800” number, which functions primarily as a 
world-wide form of continuous advertising, will not satisfy the due 
process minimum contacts scrutiny required for the exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction.65 Such cases thus far outnumber those in which 
the exercise of personal jurisdiction has been found proper based on 
Internet contacts.66 
 
(6th Cir. 1996), as an example of the “doing business over the Internet” case, to Bensusan 
Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), as an example of a “passive” 
web site where jurisdiction was improper, and to Maritz v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 
(E.D. Mo. 1996), as a case in the “middle ground,” where the interactivity and the commer-
cial nature of the exchange of information would have to be weighed. 
 63. Zippo Mfg. Corp., 952 F. Supp. at 1124. 
 64. Id. at 1126. 
 65. The majority rule is clearly that a “passive web site equals no jurisdiction.” See, e.g., 
Morantz v. Hang & Shine Ultrasonics, 79 F. Supp. 2d 537, 539 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (collecting 
cases). But see Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996). The 
Morantz Court also discusses the “middle ground” cases where the interactivity of the web site 
combined with some commercial activity is considered, and found that the mildly interactive 
web site at issue before the Court (toll free number, e-mail link, order forms that could be 
printed out) was not sufficient to permit the exercise of jurisdiction. Morantz, 79 F. Supp. 2d 
at 540. Factors that could have made the difference in favor of jurisdiction, according to the 
Morantz Court, were (1) proof that the web site directed its activity toward the forum state or 
(2) proof that significant commercial contacts had developed with forum residents as a result of 
the web site (one sale of a machine, four video sales, and five e-mail contacts were not 
enough). Id. at 542. 
 66. An illustrative but non-exhaustive list of cases finding no jurisdiction based on a pas-
sive or mildly interactive web site includes the following: People Solutions, Inc. v. People Solu-
tions, Inc., 2000 WL 1030619 (N.D. Tex., July 25, 2000) (website with several interactive 
pages, downloadable product demos, and other features not sufficient where no proof of prod-
ucts or services sold to the forum through the site); Butler v. Beer Across America, 83 F. Supp. 
2d 1261 (N.D. Ala. 2000) (finding insufficient contacts and transferring the case to defen-
dant’s home state where one order of beer sent by defendant to son of plaintiff, even though 
defendant did less than $100,000 of business with other Alabama residents, and there was a 
“limited degree of interactivity on defendant’s web site”); Minge v. Cohen, No. CIV.A.98-
2352, 2000 WL 45873 (E.D. La. Jan. 18, 2000) (finding that where plaintiff initiated most of 
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At the same time district courts have had little difficulty finding 
jurisdiction appropriate when the contacts are based on an accessible 
web site plus significant commercial activity with the forum. In the 
context of specific jurisdiction analysis, where the litigation arises out 
of or relates to the defendant’s contacts with the forum, the plaintiff 
must show either (1) a significant commercial relationship with the 
forum (whether over the Internet or through conventional con-
tacts)67 or (2) a purposeful availment or direction of the defendant’s 
contact toward the forum.68 The second prong is discussed below. 
 
the contacts with Canadian company, maintenance of a web site was not sufficient to show 
purposeful availment); JB Oxford Holdings Inc. v. Net Trade, 76 F. Supp. 2d 1363 (S.D. Fla. 
1999) (three web sites, “800” number, plus application to do business in forum not enough to 
find jurisdiction); Harbuck v. Aramco, Inc., No. CIV.A.99-1971, 1999 WL 999431 (E.D. Pa. 
Oct. 21, 1999) (passive advertising web site not sufficient for jurisdiction); Molnlycke Health 
Care AB v. Cumex Medical Surgical Products, 64 F. Supp. 2d 448 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (finding no 
jurisdiction over a web site that can be used to order products unless targeted at forum); Mil-
lennium Enterprises, Inc. v. Millennium Music, L.P., 33 F. Supp. 2d 907 (D. Or. 1999) (the 
sale of one compact disc, purchase of inventory from a forum resident, and a web site were in-
sufficient contacts to find jurisdiction); Edberg v. Neogen Corp., 17 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Conn. 
1998) (finding no jurisdiction over a web site allowing online ordering of merchandise, an e-
mail link, and a toll-free number); Patriot Systems, Inc. v. C-Cubed Corp., 21 F. Supp. 2d 1318 
(D. Utah 1998); SF Hotel Company v. Energy Investments, 985 F. Supp. 1032 (D. Kan. 
1997); and Weber v. Jolly Hotels, 977 F. Supp. 327 (D.N.J. 1997) (finding advertising web site 
insufficient, but transferring the case). 
 67. Examples of cases where the business relationship with the forum state, when taken 
together with the web site, was sufficient to find jurisdiction, in addition to Zippo Mfg. Co., 
925 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997), and CompuServe, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996), are 
Maritz v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (likening the fact that defen-
dant’s web site received 131 “hits” from the forum state, not including the plaintiff’s hits, to 
sending advertising into the forum that many times); Mieczkowski v. Masco Corp., 997 F. Supp. 
782, 788 (E.D. Tex. 1998) (traditional business contacts together with interactive web site 
sufficient to show general jurisdiction); Colt Studio, Inc. v. Badpuppy, 75 F. Supp. 2d 1104 
(C.D. Cal. 1999) (defendant’s sales of 2100 subscriptions to California residents through web 
site); and Wise v. Lindamood, 89 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (D. Colo. 1999) (moderately interactive 
web site plus real world contacts, such as mailing solicitations to residents and contracts with 
three Colorado school districts sufficient for jurisdiction). In two cases, the district courts made 
the point that, although the web site was not a basis for jurisdiction, the defendant’s real world 
business contacts with the forum nevertheless created sufficient minimum contacts. See West-
code, Inc. v. RBE Electronics, No. CIV.A.99-3004, 2000 WL 124566 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 
2000); Loudon Plastics v. Brenner Tool & Die, 74 F. Supp.2d 182 (N.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 68. In one of the few recent district court opinions to find jurisdiction based solely on 
an interactive web site which conducted online sales, but in which there was very little proof of 
direct sales to the forum, the district court in Stomp, Inc. v. NeatO, L.L.C., 61 F. Supp. 2d 
1074, 1078 (C.D. Cal. 1999), found that operating a web site that advertised and sold prod-
ucts constituted placing its products into the stream of commerce intending that they would 
be purchased by consumers with access to the web, including California citizens. This was con-
sidered purposeful availment of the forum. 
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2. Purposeful cyber-availment: directing activities toward the forum 
state 
All three of the Internet appellate decisions in which the courts 
found that they could exercise personal jurisdiction are examples in 
which the defendant directed his activities toward the forum state; 
even though it was by electronic means, and even though the in-
state commercial activity was not great.69 In addition, many of the 
district court cases cited above also discuss as significant the factor of 
whether a defendant has intentionally directed his activities toward 
the forum state. 
For example, in Intercon, Inc. v. Bell Atlantic Internet Solutions,70 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed 
the district court and found jurisdiction over a nonresident Internet 
company, Bell Atlantic Internet Solutions (“Bell Atlantic”). Accord-
ing to the plaintiff, Bell Atlantic had been allowing its customers to 
use mail servers that belonged to the plaintiff, Intercon, an Okla-
homa service provider, even after Intercon had notified Bell Atlantic 
of the mix-up. The contacts with the forum were purely digital: Bell 
Atlantic initially inadvertently routed its customers’ e-mail messages 
through Intercon’s server and then continued to route the e-mail 
traffic over Intercon’s server for four months after being notified of 
the problem. The Court of Appeals found that the “defendant pur-
posefully availed itself of the Oklahoma server for almost four 
months after being notified of the erroneous address.”71 The court 
also weighed the other factors discussed in Burger King (the burden 
on the defendant, the interest of the forum state in resolving the dis-
pute, the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining effective relief, the interstate 
judicial system’s interest in resolving disputes, and the shared interest 
of the several states in furthering substantive social policies), and 
concluded that the exercise of jurisdiction was reasonable.72  
Similarly, in CompuServe v. Patterson, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit found personal jurisdiction where 
CompuServe, a computer information service, sued Patterson, one of 
its subscribers, seeking a declaratory judgment that CompuServe had 
not infringed on Patterson’s copyright and had not otherwise en-
 
 69. See supra note 53. 
 70. 205 F.3d 1244 (10th Cir. 2000). 
 71. Id. at 1248. 
 72. Id. at 1249. 
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gaged in unfair competition.73 Patterson was a creator of software 
products who subscribed to CompuServe’s shareware distribution 
service. Patterson had entered into a contract with CompuServe 
which was governed by and construed according to Ohio law. Pat-
terson assented to this contract electronically and transmitted the 
agreement to CompuServe over the Internet. Over a four-year busi-
ness relationship, Patterson transmitted thirty-two different software 
files to CompuServe’s system in Ohio. However, Patterson sold only 
six hundred fifty dollars worth of his software to twelve Ohio resi-
dents. After CompuServe marketed a web-browser type of product 
that Patterson considered too similar to his own, Patterson notified 
CompuServe (via e-mail) that he considered its products to have in-
fringed on his trademarks and demanded one hundred thousand dol-
lars to settle his claims. CompuServe brought an action in Ohio seek-
ing a declaratory judgment of no infringement, and other relief.74 
Although Patterson’s contacts with the forum had “been almost en-
tirely electronic in nature,” the Sixth Circuit found them sufficient 
under the due process clause because Patterson had purposefully di-
rected his activities toward Ohio.75 Physical presence was not re-
quired.76 
Finally, in Panavision International, L.P. v. Toeppen, applying 
trademark law, the Ninth Circuit permitted jurisdiction over a non-
resident who had registered “panavision.com” and several other do-
main names using Panavision company trademarks for his own use, 
and preventing Panavision International from using those names as 
addresses on the Internet unless it paid him thirteen thousand dol-
lars.77 The defendant, Toeppen, had few physical-world contacts with 
 
 73. 89 F.3d 1257, 1259 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 74. Id. at 1260–61. 
 75. Id. at 1262. The Sixth Circuit in CompuServe carefully applied and fully discussed a 
three-part test: (1) the defendant had purposefully availed himself of doing business in the fo-
rum; (2) the action arose from the defendant’s activities in the forum; and (3) whether the acts 
of the defendant or consequences of the defendant had a substantial enough connection to the 
forum to make the exercise of jurisdiction reasonable. Id. at 1263. 
 76. Id. at 1264. The key facts for the Sixth Circuit were 
that Patterson chose to transmit his software from Texas to CompuServe’s system in 
Ohio, that myriad others gained access to Patterson’s software via that system, and 
that Patterson advertised and sold his product through that system. Though all this 
happened with a distinct paucity of tangible, physical evidence, there can be no 
doubt that Patterson purposefully transacted business in Ohio. 
 Id. at 1264–65. 
 77. 141 F.3d 1316, 1318 (9th Cir. 1998). The Ninth Circuit offered the following ex-
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California. The Ninth Circuit applied the “purposeful availment” 
test.78 The Court first excluded cases in which the only contact with 
the forum was a web site that was merely accessible to forum resi-
dents.79 However, the Court went on to find purposeful availment to 
be present in this case because the defendant intentionally aimed his 
conduct at Panavision with the intent to harm Panavision, which had 
its principal place of business in California.80 These circumstances 
were found to meet the purposeful availment test.81 Congress has 
 
planation of domain names and their significance at the time of the case: 
Every web site on the Internet has an identifier called a “domain name.” The do-
main name often consists of a person’s name or a company’s name or trademark. 
For example, Pepsi has a web page with a web site domain name consisting of the 
company name, Pepsi and .com, the “top level” domain designation: Pepsi.com. 
The Internet is divided into several “top level” domains: .edu for education; .org for 
organizations; .gov for government entities; .net for networks; and .com for “com-
mercial,” which functions as a catchall domain for Internet users. Domain names 
with the .com designation must be registered with Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI). 
NSI registers names on a first-come, first-served basis for a $100 registration fee. 
Id. The practice of registering a known trade name or corporation as one’s own domain name 
became known as “cybersquatting.” 
 78. Id. at 1320. 
 79. The Ninth Circuit had previously rejected the notion of finding jurisdiction in a case 
where the only contact was maintaining a web site accessible to anyone. See Cybersell, Inc. v. 
Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 419–20 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 80. Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1321. The Ninth Circuit relied upon the “effects test” set 
forth in Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) (holding that personal jurisdiction may be found 
where intentional conduct is aimed at the forum state and causes harm that the defendant 
knows will be suffered in the forum state). See also Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 
56–57 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding jurisdiction in defamation case where article posted on web site 
by nonresident was aimed at Washington, D.C., audience, and directly related to political 
world of D.C. users); TELCO Communications v. An Apple A Day, 977 F. Supp. 404, 405–
08 (E.D. Va. 1997) (nonresident corporation’s posting of two press releases on web site aimed 
at defaming a Virginia corporation subject to jurisdiction in Virginia); EDIAS Software Int’l, 
L.L.C. v BASIS Int’l Ltd., 947 F. Supp. 413 (D. Ariz. 1996) (defamatory e-mail regarding 
resident corporation, and web site accessible in forum sufficient to find jurisdiction). But see 
Bailey v. Turbine Design, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 790, 795 (W.D. Tenn. 2000) (denying jurisdiction 
where plaintiffs brought defamation and other claims against defendants, plaintiffs’ business 
competitors, who had a web site on which defendants referred to plaintiffs as “con men” and 
posted information pertaining to one plaintiff’s prior arrest records, but where there was no 
evidence that defendants intended to reach out to forum state or that forum state citizens had 
visited the site). The district court in Bailey focused on the lack of any evidence that the defen-
dants had “deliberately or knowingly targeted” the forum state. 
 81. Where the defendant aims to harm a plaintiff by infringing activity, and harmful ef-
fects result, courts may apply the Panavision approach and allow jurisdiction even where the 
contacts are few. See, e.g., Online Partners.com, Inc. v. Atlanticnet Media Corp., No. 
CIV.A.C98-4146SIENE, 2000 WL 101242 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2000) (finding jurisdiction 
where defendant infringed on plaintiff’s trademark, even though only one subscriber was in 
California); see also Nat’l Football League v. Miller, No. 99 CIV. 11846 JSM, 2000 WL 
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addressed the issue of “cyber-squatting” by passing the “Anticyber-
squatting Consumer Protection Act,” effective November 29, 1999, 
which allows registered trademark owners to file in rem civil actions 
against domain names for trademark dilution under § 43(c) of the 
Lanham Act.82 
3. Web site interactivity and general jurisdiction 
As the discussion of Supreme Court personal jurisdiction shows, 
establishing the “continuous and systematic” contacts with a forum 
that will allow the exercise of personal jurisdiction in cases in which 
the litigation does not arise out of or relate to the forum can be diffi-
cult.83 Because the World Wide Web allows a commercial enterprise 
to establish a round-the-clock “virtual presence” at every computer 
on the globe which has an Internet connection, the concept of “con-
tinuous and systematic” contacts, as opposed to specific minimum 
contacts based on individual transactions, appears to better fit the 
facts of most Internet-related attempts to establish jurisdiction.84 
 
335566 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2000) (finding jurisdiction where defendant used NFL trademarks 
to link users to sports gambling sites on ground that defendant “derived substantial income 
from interstate commerce” and plaintiffs alleged that the linking of NFL’s trademarks to gam-
bling caused damages to the NFL’s image and marketing efforts in New York). Some of the 
language of the district court in National Football League is quite expansive, suggesting that 
the defendant “had to recognize” that because New York had two NFL teams, “his site would 
ultimately appear on thousands of computer screens in New York.” This was not the basis for 
the finding of jurisdiction, however, because the court concluded that “since [the defendant] 
substantially profits from the activity that does damage to the plaintiffs in New York, it does 
not offend due process to require him to defend his actions in a New York courtroom.” Id. 
 82. See Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501A-545 (1999); 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(2)(A) 
(2000). See, e.g., Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Allporsche.com, Nos. 99-1804, 99-2152, 2000 
WL 742185 (4th Cir. June 9, 2000) (remanding district court’s denial of in rem jurisdiction 
against domain names, brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1655 (2000), for reconsideration under 
new anti-cybersquatting law). 
 83. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984). 
 84. Several of the Internet district court cases have involved claims of general jurisdic-
tion. See, e.g., Westcode, Inc. v. RBE Elec., No. CIV.A.99-3004, 2000 WL 124566 (E.D. Pa. 
Feb. 1, 2000) (finding specific jurisdiction based on real world contacts, but using a general 
jurisdiction analysis in noting that a passive website’s accessibility was not sufficient to establish 
continuous and systematic contacts); Molnlycke Health Care AB v. Cumex Med. Surgical 
Prods., 64 F. Supp. 2d 448 (E.D. Pa. 1999) (denying general jurisdiction); Mieczkowski v. 
Masco Corp., 997 F. Supp. 782, 788 (E.D. Tex. 1998) (finding general jurisdiction); Atlan-
tech Distrib., Inc. v. Credit Gen. Ins. Co., 30 F. Supp. 2d 534, 536–37 (D. Md. 1998); We-
ber v. Jolly Hotels, 977 F. Supp. 327 (D.N.J. 1997); SF Hotel Co. v. Energy Inv., 985 F. 
Supp. 1032 (D. Kan. 1997). 
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In Coastal Video Communications Corp. v. Staywell Corp.,85 the 
district court ultimately concluded that it needed more evidence to 
decide whether to allow an exercise of general jurisdiction, and per-
mitted the plaintiff to conduct jurisdictional discovery.86 Yet, the 
Court was sensitive to the fact that Internet technology in the mar-
ket place presents a basis for exercising general jurisdiction much 
greater than “mere advertising and solicitation of products.” The 
Court explained: 
The sites allow the on-line visitor to purchase all of [defendant’s] 
products through the web site, without ever speaking to a [com-
pany] representative. In addition, if a customer did have questions, 
the site also provides a mechanism for those questions to be posed 
and answered through the exchange of e-mail. In essence, [defen-
dant] has established an on-line storefront that is readily accessible 
to every person in Virginia with a computer, a modem, and access 
to the World Wide Web. Thus, instead of using physical assets such 
as sample-bearing salesmen, or traditional business offices to reach 
[the forum], and . . . customers, [defendant] is able to provide the 
same level of service via the Internet’s instant connections.87 
Although the defendant did have some traditional business con-
tacts with the forum, the Court did not find the record sufficient to 
conclude that general jurisdiction was appropriate. In giving some 
guidance as to the kind of proof necessary to establish the “continu-
ous and systematic” contacts necessary for general jurisdiction, the 
Court explained that it was not sufficient to “find that an interactive 
web site has the potential to reach a significant percentage of the fo-
rum state’s population.”88 For “the contact to be continuous and 
systematic, there must be proof that the web site is actually reaching 
a portion of the state’s population.”89 Information such as “the 
amount of sales generated in the state by or through the interactive 
web site” and the number of times a web site has been accessed by 
residents or businesses located in a specific state would be relevant to 
a determination of general jurisdiction.90 
 
 85. 59 F. Supp. 2d 562 (E.D. Va. 1999). 
 86. Id. at 572. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 571 (emphasis added). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 572. The court also noted that the Zippo sliding scale test was not as useful in 
analyzing general jurisdiction cases because it focuses more on the level of the web site’s inter-
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Given the ease with which a web server can log the number of 
“hits” which access a given web site—as shown by the tendency of 
some commercial web sites to require users to provide registration 
information, and the widespread use of “cookies”91 by web sites to 
keep track of consumers who visit web sites—it is extremely plausible 
that litigants may have a treasure trove of information available to 
them demonstrating the number of times a web site has been visited 
by residents of a particular state. In view of this technological devel-
opment, it is conceivable that general jurisdiction will become easier 
to show if parties, such as those in the Coastal Video case, are given 
the opportunity to conduct jurisdictional discovery. 
C. State Cases Applying Personal Jurisdiction Jurisprudence to the 
Internet 
State courts have fewer reported (or otherwise available) opin-
ions on the question of jurisdiction and the Internet, but there is 
relevant state decisional law in at least seventeen jurisdictions. In Ari-
zona,92 California,93 Connecticut,94 Delaware,95 Florida,96 Indiana,97 
 
activity than on the “quantity and nature of the Internet-based contacts with the forum,” fac-
tors which the court felt the Zippo test did not adequately reflect. Id. at 568–71. This critique 
was echoed by the court in Winfield Collection, Ltd. v. McCauley, which found the “interac-
tive” category vague and suggested there is still a need for an “Internet-focused test for [mini-
mum contacts]” with the forum state. 2000 WL 1034648 (E.D. Mich. July 24, 2000). 
 91. A cookie is a small data file which a webserver sends electronically to any user who 
accesses a web site. It is recorded on the user’s hard drive. The user is assigned a number or 
other identifying code within the cookie, which is unique to that user. When the user returns 
to that web site, the web server reads the cookie it previously assigned the user, and recognizes 
the user as the person who visited the site previously. Web servers can also log the originating 
Internet protocol address of visiting users, and also track the time spent on the site, as well as 
what parts of the web page the viewer “clicked on.” This address can then be associated with a 
particular geographical area, but may correspond to the location of the ISP rather than the in-
dividual user. E-commerce merchants are increasingly using such record keeping methods to 
track individual consumer preferences to “personalize their browsing experience,” i.e., to “di-
rect-market” to the individual person, and to survey and forecast consumer trends. Peter H. 
Lewis, Battling Cookie Monsters, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2000, at G1. 
 92. Rollin v. William V. Frankel & Co., 996 P.2d 1254 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (no juris-
diction allowed in suit by investors in worthless securities against non-resident “market mak-
ers” where defendants had no physical contacts with Arizona and purposeful availment of 
NASDAQ electronic quote system was not the same as purposeful availment of the privilege of 
conducting business in Arizona). 
 93. See Jewish Defense Org. v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 611 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1999) (applying Zippo-type analysis: passive web site insufficient basis for jurisdiction even 
where nonresident defendant contracted with in-state ISP’s); Hall v. LaRonde, 66 Cal. Rptr. 
2d 399 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that repeated e-mails in commercial course of conduct 
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Massachusetts,98 Michigan,99 Minnesota,100 Missouri,101 Montana,102 
New Jersey,103 New York,104 North Carolina,105 Texas,106 Virginia,107 
 
between two parties are sufficient contacts to allow jurisdiction). 
 94. See MacMullen v. Villa Roma Country Club, No. CV 970405070S, 1998 WL 
867271 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998) (finding that 450 direct mailings to forum out of 15,000 
and running of advertising in magazines were not sufficient contacts to find jurisdiction in per-
sonal injury case, and post-injury web site irrelevant where no proof that any forum residents 
accessed it). But see Gates v. Royal Palace, No. CV 9866595S, 1998 WL 951002 (Conn. Su-
per. Ct. 1998) (finding jurisdiction where defendant has some other contacts with the forum, 
including a web site). 
 95. See Clayton v. Farb, No. 97C-10-306-WTQ, 1998 WL 283468 (Del. Super. Ct. 
1998) (finding no jurisdictional basis for suit by plaintiff resident of Maryland against web site 
that posted allegedly false statements about plaintiff where defendant had no business with fo-
rum, and statement was not aimed at the forum, but the web site was accessible in the forum 
and the statute of limitations of the forum was favorable to plaintiff). 
 96. See Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct Access, Inc., 636 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1994) (allowing jurisdiction would offend traditional notions of fair play and substan-
tial justice where plaintiff was a Florida-based computerized airlines reservation system suing a 
nonresident travel agency that had only dealt directly with plaintiff’s New York office, had sent 
lease payments to Florida, and had regularly accessed the computer system in Florida, but did 
not have any reasonable expectation of being haled into court in Florida because almost all the 
physical world contacts occurred in New York). 
 97. See Conseco, Inc. v. Hickerson, 698 N.E.2d 816 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that 
the mere mentioning of plaintiff on defendant’s web site was not sufficient minimum contact 
to allow finding of jurisdiction and that proper test was not the “effects” test but the level of 
interactivity of the site and the commercial nature of the information exchange). 
 98. See Better Boating Assocs., Inc. v. BMG Chart Prods., Inc. 8 Mass. L. Rptr. 658, 
No. CIV.A.97-3738-E, 1998 WL 408976 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1998) (finding that, in partner-
ship dispute, advertising over web site and national trade magazine, when directed toward fo-
rum, may be taken into account along with other business contacts in finding personal jurisdic-
tion). 
 99. See Clapper et al. v. Freeman Marine Equip., Inc., No. 211139 (Mich. Ct. App. 
June 16, 2000) (unpublished) (finding no jurisdiction where real world contacts were insignifi-
cant and website played no role in transactions at issue and was only mildly interactive in that it 
permitted the ordering of a catalog online) (visited Dec. 9, 2000) <http://www.michbar.org/ 
opinions/appeals/2000/061600/7378.html>. 
 100. See State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997), 
aff’d, 576 N.W.2d 747 (Minn. 1998) (holding that gambling web site’s invitation to users to 
join mailing list, and providing of form, along with an “800” telephone number was sufficient 
in action for deceptive trade practices and fraud). 
 101. See State v. Beer Nuts, Ltd., No. ED 76192, 2000 WL 270671 (Mo. Ct. App. Mar. 
14, 2000) (finding that delivery of thousands of bottles of beer to hundreds of Missouri resi-
dents was purposeful availment and sufficient minimum contacts). 
 102. See Bedrejo v. Triple E Canada, Ltd., 984 P.2d 739, 743 (Mont. 1999) (finding no 
jurisdiction where only contact is web site and auto accident by Canadian manufactured motor 
home). 
 103. See Blakey v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 751 A.2d 538 (N.J. 2000) (reversing appel-
late court finding of no jurisdiction and remanding to allow jurisdictional discovery where de-
fendant co-workers posted allegedly defamatory comments about plaintiff on electronic bulle-
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and Wisconsin108 courts have all waded into the roiling waters of “e-
jurisdiction.” As we saw in our examination of the federal cases, the 
state courts dealing with this question have conducted careful, fact-
based analyses to determine whether or not to exercise jurisdiction. 
Not surprisingly, because the question requires a Fourteenth 
Amendment analysis as set out in the Supreme Court’s jurispru-
dence, the state cases follow the same analytical framework as the 
federal cases. Some state courts explicitly reference or implicitly fol-
low the “sliding scale” approach articulated in the Zippo case or in 
 
tin board located outside of forum state and where record was not sufficient to determine 
whether defendants knowingly and purposefully made statements in order to harm plaintiff’s 
pursuit of civil rights in forum state). 
 104. See People v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., 1999 WL 591995 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1999) (finding that physical world business contacts between forum state, combined with 
Internet activity is sufficient for jurisdiction); People v. Lipsitz, 174 Misc. 2d 571, 663 
N.Y.S.2d 468 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (finding sufficient contacts to exercise jurisdiction where 
magazine subscription business located in forum sent e-mails soliciting subscribers to forum 
residents, sold subscriptions to forum residents over the Internet). 
 105. See Replacements, Ltd. v. Midwesterling, 515 S.E.2d 46 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (al-
lowing jurisdiction where advertising web site was a factor in minimum contacts analysis and 
other business contacts with plaintiff existed); Hiawassee Stables, Inc. v. Cunningham, 519 
S.E.2d 317 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that web site data base where defendants did not 
advertise or solicit business and had no communications over Internet with plaintiffs was not 
sufficient, in the absence of any other evidence that defendants had availed themselves of fo-
rum). 
 106. See Daimler-Benz v. Olson, No. 03-99-00114-CV, 2000 WL 766271 (Tex. Ct. 
App. June 15, 2000) (finding general jurisdiction over German parent company where adver-
tising, corporate structure, distribution agreement, and somewhat interactive web site were 
factors showing systematic contacts); Jones v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 995 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. Ct. 
App. 1999) (using “sliding scale” analysis, Court found that when combined with evidence of 
other business contacts, a “somewhat interactive web site” was an appropriate factor, though 
insufficient by itself, to allow jurisdiction); Mayo Clinic v. Jackson, No. 05-98-00225-CV, 
1998 WL 699385 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998) (holding Mayo clinic amenable to Texas jurisdiction 
where continuing real world contacts with forum were shown, and advertising web site treated 
like advertising in a nationally circulated magazine). 
 107. See Melvin v. Doe, No. 21942, 1999 WL 551335, 27 Media L. Rep. 2144 (Va. Cir. 
Ct. 1999) (finding that posting of defamatory material on AOL web site in Virginia was not 
sufficient contacts with Virginia where no evidence showed that it was directed to forum, solic-
ited a response from the forum, or had any commercial purpose). 
 108. See Wisconsin v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, No. 97-C-711-5 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 18, 1998) 
(unpublished) (finding jurisdiction over out-of-state Internet lottery operators where facts 
showed that Internet solicitation was expressly directed to Wisconsin residents and 180 resi-
dents registered to play); Catalytic Combustion Corp. v. Vapor Extraction Tech., No. 00-
0450-FT, 2000 WL 1124245 n.5 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000) (allowing jurisdiction where contrac-
tual contacts were with a Wisconsin company and a passive website was considered along with 
other contacts). 
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other federal decisions.109 The cases fall somewhat evenly on either 
side of the jurisdiction question, with about half of the courts finding 
jurisdiction and the other half rejecting it. 
1. The requirement of other business contacts or purposeful direction of 
conduct toward the forum state 
State courts have clearly required either strong real-world busi-
ness contacts with the forum state, or clear purposeful direction of 
conduct toward the state, before the courts will exercise jurisdiction. 
In no case has the mere accessibility of a web site been found suffi-
cient to support an exercise of jurisdiction. Replacements, Ltd. v. 
Midwesterling is a typical example of the application of the rule re-
quiring real world contacts and/or purposeful availment.110 The 
Court of Appeals of North Carolina reversed a trial court’s grant of a 
motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction because the facts 
showed the defendant (1) directly solicited business in the state by 
mailing an advertisement to fifty North Carolina citizens, (2) had a 
continual supplier relationship with the plaintiff amounting to sixty-
five thousand dollars in business, (3) made ten purchases from plain-
tiff, (4) telephoned plaintiff, (5) had other business relationships 
with plaintiff, and (6) had “a web site, which allows residents 
throughout the United States, including North Carolina, to place 
orders via Internet access.”111 In cases such as Replacements, in which 
the business contacts are clear, the existence of an Internet connec-
tion is just one more factor to add to the minimum contacts or pur-
poseful availment analysis.112 
 
 109. See, e.g., Jewish Defense Org. v. Superior Court, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 611, 620–21 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 1999) (citing Zippo Mfg., Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp 1119 (W.D. Pa. 
1997)); Bedrejo v. Triple E Canada, Ltd., 984 P.2d 739, 743 (Mont. 1999) (citing Millen-
nium Enter. v. Millennium Music, L.P., 33 F. Supp. 2d 906 (D. Or. 1999)); Jones v. Beech 
Aircraft Corp., 995 S.W.2d 767, 772–73 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Mieczdowski v. Masco 
Corp., 997 F. Supp. 782 (E.D. Tex. 1998)). 
 110. 515 S.E.2d 46 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999). 
 111. Id. at 48–49. The Court of Appeals found both that the defendant had minimum 
contacts with the forum, and that it had purposefully directed its conduct toward the forum 
and availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in the state. 
 112. Falling into this category of cases granting jurisdiction are: Hall v. Laurent, 56 Cal. 
App. 4th 1342 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); Better Boating Associates, Inc. v. BMG Chart Products, 
Inc., 8 Mass. L. Rptr. 658, No. CIV.A.97-3738-E, 1998 WL 408976 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
1998); Daimler-Benz v. Olson, No. 03-99-00114-CV, 2000 WL 766271 (Tex. Ct. App. June 
15, 2000); Jones v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 995 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999); and Mayo 
Clinic v. Jackson, No. 05-98-00225-CV, 1998 WL 699385 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998). 
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In cases in which the facts showing real world business contacts 
are less compelling, courts have had more difficulty weighing the 
impact that should be given Internet-related contacts. In December 
1998, on somewhat similar facts, the Superior Court of Connecticut 
issued two opinions with different results in personal injury cases 
against nonresident defendants.113 Connecticut resident Nancy Gates 
sued a hotel associated with Disney World in Florida after being hit 
by a valet parking driver there.114 The defendant hotel moved to 
dismiss, citing no minimum contacts with the forum.115 The record 
disclosed that the hotel had advertised in various national print me-
dia; maintained its own interactive web site, through which a user 
could make reservations, book packages or request information; was 
listed on a travel brochure available in Connecticut and on a Disney-
related web site as one of the “Seven Official Hotels of Walt Disney 
World in Disney Village”; and since 1995 had advertised in Con-
necticut publications forty times.116 The court noted that the plaintiff 
would have to show “additional activity in this state” beyond mere 
advertising, to establish jurisdiction. For that additional activity, the 
Court looked to the fact that the hotel had provided some brochures 
“specifically” for distribution in Connecticut, had targeted its adver-
tising in the forum forty times in what appeared to be a “rather in-
tense advertising effort,” and also operated a web site that allowed 
residents to make reservations and get information.117 Having found 
 
 113. See MacMullen v. Villa Roma Country Club, No. CV 970405070S, 1998 WL 
867271 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998) (finding no jurisdiction under long-arm statute allowing ju-
risdiction when a foreign corporation has “repeatedly solicited business,” where defendant had 
sent direct mailings into the state but had no active website); Gates v. Royal Palace, No. CV 
9866595S, 1998 WL 951002 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1998) (allowing jurisdiction under a more 
stringent long-arm statute requiring “transacting business” in the state, where the defendant 
had both real world advertising, business contacts, and Internet contacts with the state). 
 114. See Gates, 1998 WL 951002, at *5. 
 115. Specifically, the hotel contended it had no place of business or telephone listing in 
Connecticut, did not advertise there or in publications circulated there, had no bank accounts 
or real estate there, had no agents there, was not owned by Walt Disney World Corporation, 
and did not purposefully direct any activities toward Connecticut and had no continuous and 
systematic business relationship with Connecticut. Id. at *1. 
 116. Id. at *1–2. 
 117. Id. at *4. The court found: 
[T]he combination of a concentrated advertising effort within this state, in combina-
tion with the active booking of reservations for Connecticut citizens through Con-
necticut travel agents, together with the invitation to Connecticut citizens to make 
reservations and other arrangements with the defendant directly through the Inter-
net, constitutes the transaction of business within this state.  
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that the hotel “transacted business” within the forum for purposes of 
the long arm statute, the Court then concluded that it was foresee-
able to the hotel that out-of-state residents might sue for injuries 
sustained at the hotel and that the suit did not offend traditional no-
tions of fair play and substantial justice. 
In MacMullen v. Villa Roma Country Club,118 a slip and fall case, 
a New York resort had sent four hundred fifty direct mailings to re-
cent and past guests and others requesting information in Connecti-
cut, attended travel fairs in the state, placed advertisements in maga-
zines, and maintained a toll-free number. Plaintiff also contended 
that the resort had specifically solicited her retirement group in three 
different mailings. These contacts were not found to be sufficient to 
allow jurisdiction under a separate long-arm statute allowing suit 
where a foreign corporation “repeatedly solicits” business in the fo-
rum state.119 The Court took note of the fact that, after the plaintiff 
had sustained her injury at the resort, the resort had maintained a 
web site, but stated that there was “no factual showing that any 
Connecticut resident actually accessed the web site.”120 
Given the similarity in the facts between Gates and MacMullen, 
the prominent factual distinction between the cases is clearly the 
presence of an interactive web site in Gates (the web site was opera-
tional at the time of the injury and clearly allowed business transac-
tions), and the lack of any proof of the relevance of the web site in 
MacMullen (the web site was not yet up when the accident hap-
pened, and there was no proof regarding its interactivity). Indeed, by 
suggesting that a factual showing that forum residents had accessed 
the web site would be a relevant consideration, even though the web 
site was not operational at the time of the injury, the Court in 
MacMullen appeared to indicate that such facts would be relevant to 
showing continuous and systematic contacts necessary for general ju-
risdiction. The different results in Gates and MacMullen support the 
notion that, in close factual cases, proof regarding a web site’s inter-
activity, and particularly evidence of the number of “hits” it has re-
ceived from forum residents, will be considered relevant to a finding 
of jurisdiction.121 
 
Id. 
 118. No. CV 970405070S, 1998 WL 867271 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 3, 1998). 
 119. Id. at 3–4. 
 120. Id. at 4. 
 121. The Montana Supreme Court suggested this fact would be relevant in Bedrejo v. 
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The “purposeful direction of conduct toward the forum” basis 
for finding jurisdiction is also prevalent in the state cases, particularly 
in defamation actions. In Blakey v. Continental Airlines,122 the New 
Jersey Supreme Court reversed a court of appeals decision denying 
jurisdiction in a case in which an airline pilot claimed that certain 
comments by co-employees posted on an internal electronic bulletin 
board of Continental Airlines, which was not physically located in 
New Jersey, constituted defamation and harassment. The New Jersey 
Supreme Court recognized that it was treading in new territory, but 
it nevertheless relied on traditional principles. 
The court essentially concluded that if a factual record could be 
created showing (1) that defendants’ statements were defamatory 
and (2) that defendants made such statements with “the knowledge 
or purpose of causing harm to plaintiff in the pursuit of her civil 
rights claims in New Jersey, [then] those intentional contacts with 
the forum would satisfy the minimum contacts requirements of In-
ternational Shoe.”123 Because the court could not determine from the 
record whether the defendants intended their statements to hinder 
plaintiff’s New Jersey civil rights, the case was remanded so that ju-
risdictional discovery could be pursued by the plaintiff. 
In some respects, the New Jersey Supreme Court combines the 
minimum contacts test with the purposeful availment test, suggest-
ing that intentional defamation directed toward the forum state 
would be a per se form of minimum contact. Such an analysis may 
suggest that the purposeful availment factor, focusing on the defen-
dant’s intent, lends itself more readily to Internet-related cases than 
does a minimum contacts factor based on traditional real-world 
business or economic ties to the forum state.124 
By contrast, the Indiana Court of Appeals declined to apply the 
“effects” test in a defamation case in which the target of the defama-
 
Triple E Canada, Ltd., 984 P.2d 739 (Mont. 1999), when it found that minimum contacts 
were not sufficient by pointing out that “although [defendant’s] web site is available for view-
ing in Montana, there was no evidence of any transactions with Montana residents through 
that web site.” Id. at 743. 
 122. 751 A.2d 538 (N.J. 2000). 
 123. Id. at 556. 
 124. Interestingly, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Blakey discussed not only civil juris-
diction rules in reaching its decision, but criminal rules as well. The theme that emerges from 
the court’s discussion is that for any exercise of state jurisdiction to meet the requirements of 
due process, there must be some intentional or knowingly caused effect that occurs in the fo-
rum state. Id. at 555. 
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tory comments posted online was a corporation. The Court found 
the test “not readily applicable in cases involving national or interna-
tional corporations and the Internet” because harm to a corporation 
“is generally not located in a particular geographic location as an in-
dividual’s harm would be.”125 
Another state case deserving attention is Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System 
One, Direct Access, Inc.,126 a district court case from Florida. The case 
is significant because, unlike many cases, it treats the situation in 
which, effectively, the web site operator sues the user (instead of the 
reverse). In that case, the plaintiff operated a computerized hotel and 
airlines reservation system and the defendant was a travel agency that 
had contracted to use the system. Because the plaintiff database op-
erator had branch offices in the defendant’s state, and much of the 
business had been conducted between the plaintiff’s branch office 
and the defendant in that state, the court did not find that the de-
fendant’s repeated use of the database in Florida, and sending of 
lease payments to Florida, was sufficient to allow an exercise of juris-
diction by the Florida courts. The court found it significant that 
there was no proof that the defendant was even aware that the data-
base was located in Florida and would have reasonably expected to 
be haled into court there.127 
Like the federal courts, the state courts hearing questions of civil 
jurisdiction involving Internet activity have found the traditional Su-
preme Court due process analysis to be helpful. The emerging rule is 
that the accessibility of a nonresident’s web site in the forum will 
not, in and of itself, be considered a sufficient basis for due process. 
When combined with other traditional business contacts, proof of a 
web site’s accessibility and interactivity, particularly if accompanied 
by proof that forum residents have accessed the site and conducted 
transactions over the site, is capable of meeting the minimum con-
tacts standard. If there are not many traditional commercial contacts, 
then a defendant’s intentional directing of his activities at the forum 
 
 125. Conseco, Inc. v. Hickerson, 698 N.E.2d 816, 819 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). 
 126. 636 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. Ct. App. 1994). 
 127. Id. Citing Westlaw and LEXIS as examples of the data bases which customers from 
around the country use, the court believed it would be “wildly beyond the reasonable expecta-
tions of such computer-information users,” that they would be haled into court in whatever 
state where the data base’s billing office is located, regardless of whether the user is solicited, 
engaged, and serviced entirely in-state by the data company’s local representatives. Id. at 1353 
n.2. 
1BER-FIN.DOC 12/9/00  1:29 PM 
1305] www.wildwest.gov 
 1335 
may still provide a basis under the purposeful availment test. Proof 
relating to defendant’s web site traffic may also be relevant to this 
determination. 
2. State civil enforcement actions involving Internet-related conduct 
The same standards of personal jurisdiction applicable in civil 
cases generally apply in civil enforcement actions brought by a state 
attorney general. The reported cases dealing with state enforcement 
actions involving Internet-related conduct are consistent with the 
rules discussed in private civil actions. 
Both of the New York state cases dealing with attorney general 
enforcement actions concerning unlawful conduct on the Internet—
an Internet gambling operation and an e-mail fraud scheme—were 
cases in which the defendants were physically located in New York 
and conducted a significant amount of real-world business in New 
York.128 Nevertheless, language from these cases suggests some will-
ingness on the part of the New York courts to consider exercising ju-
risdiction in Internet cases even when the defendant is not physically 
present. For example, in the World Interactive Gaming Corp. case, 
the Court stated: “even without physical presence in New York, 
WIGC’s activities are sufficient to meet the minimum contact re-
quirement.”129 The WIGC web site was used to conduct gambling 
with New York residents, and further used advertising to actively so-
licit New Yorkers.130 
Similarly, although the defendant Lipsitz was physically present 
in New York, the Court used a broader standard, that “[t]he first ju-
risdictional consideration is whether the litigation target has estab-
lished a physical presence or a sufficiently close equivalent in the juris-
diction.”131 Merely maintaining a web site accessible to residents of 
the forum would not constitute an equivalent physical presence, but 
 
 128. See People v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., 1999 WL 591995 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1999) (finding that defendant’s corporate headquarters in forum, decision making and product 
development in forum, calls to investors made from forum, prospectuses sent from forum all 
showed defendants “clearly doing business in New York for purposes of acquiring personal 
jurisdiction”); People v. Lipsitz, 174 Misc. 2d 571 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (holding that de-
fendant’s operation based in Staten Island, New York, “acts complained of physically occurred 
in New York, even though impact may have been in another location,” courts have “clear ju-
risdiction over persons actually present in New York”). 
 129. World Interactive Gaming Corp., 1999 WL 591995, at *4. 
 130. Id. at *4–5. 
 131. Lipsitz, 174 Misc. 2d at 578. 
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conducting business in the forum by subscribing to a local ISP and 
selling a product over the Internet would be sufficient for jurisdic-
tion.132 Because of their strong facts in support of real world contacts 
with the forum, both New York cases are of little assistance in resolv-
ing the “hard” cases in which physical contacts with the forum are 
not so clear. 
The case of Minnesota v. Granite Gate Resorts offers an example 
in which the real world contacts with the forum were not extensive, 
but the Court nevertheless found jurisdiction in an enforcement ac-
tion by the Attorney General of Minnesota.133 In Granite Gate, the 
attorney general sued a Nevada resident and his corporation, which 
was offering online sports gambling through a web site sponsored by 
a company called WagerNet, located in Belize, Central America. Af-
ter a preliminary investigation showed that the company was telling 
consumers that the betting was legal and would be operational by 
the football season in 1995, the attorney general filed a complaint 
alleging, among other claims, deceptive trade practices and consumer 
fraud. The defendant refused to comply with discovery requests for 
the company’s mailing list; so the Court assumed for the purpose of 
the litigation that the mailing list contained at least one Minnesota 
resident.134 
In analyzing personal jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals consid-
ered both the Minnesota long-arm statute and the Supreme Court 
jurisprudence on the minimum contacts necessary to meet due proc-
ess standards. The defendant claimed that posting information on a 
web site did not amount to purposeful availment of the privileges of 
doing business in Minnesota. The Court applied a five-part test 
which considered “(1) the quantity of the contacts; (2) the nature 
and quality of the contacts; (3) the connection between the cause of 
action and the contacts; (4) the interests of the state in providing a 
forum; and (5) the convenience of the parties.”135 
As to the quantity of the contacts and the general accessibility of 
the web site the Court considered the number of times Minnesotans 
accessed the site and received information from the web site (248 
contacts in a two-week period), the fact that Minnesotans as a group 
 
 132. Id. (citing CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996)). 
 133. State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., 568 N.W.2d 715 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997). 
 134. Id. at 717–18. 
 135. Id. at 718. 
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were among the top five hundred most frequent visitors to the site, 
residents called the company at their advertised phone numbers, and 
at least one Minnesotan was on their mailing list. In considering the 
“nature and quality” of the contacts, the Court was not troubled by 
the fact that the advertising and information posted was not specifi-
cally targeted toward the forum. The Court inferred the defendant’s 
intent to serve the market of the forum from the fact that the com-
pany was “inviting United States users to download these images” 
and relied upon Minnesota precedent holding that defendants who 
know their message will be broadcast in the state are subject to suit 
there.136 
Because the suit and the web site pertained to a sports betting 
operation, the Court found the cause of action and the contacts with 
the forum to be connected and further held that the “state’s interest 
in providing a forum to enforce its consumer protection laws weighs 
in favor of exerting jurisdiction.”137 The Court paid little attention to 
the issue of the convenience of the parties, finding that modern 
technology made defense of a suit in a foreign tribunal less burden-
some. In sum, all the factors favored a finding of jurisdiction and the 
Court upheld the denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss based on 
lack of personal jurisdiction. 
In the area of alcohol distribution over the Internet, states have 
also pressed enforcement actions to prevent the unregulated sale of 
certain substances over the Internet, such as alcoholic beverages, par-
ticularly sales to minors. In State v. Beer Nuts, Ltd.,138 the Missouri 
Attorney General sought a permanent injunction and fine against 
Beer Nuts, Ltd., a North Carolina micro-brewery beer-of-the-month 
membership club doing business as Hog’s Head Beer Cellars, for 
selling beer in Missouri without complying with Missouri licensing, 
testing, and inspection laws, and without abiding by Missouri laws 
requiring alcohol retailers to seek proof of age to avoid sales to mi-
 
 136. Id. at 719–20. The court compared Internet advertisements to broadcast and direct 
mail solicitation “in that advertisers distribute messages to Internet users, and users must take 
affirmative action to receive the advertised product.” The Court cited the company’s use of 
English-language advertising as proof of intent to reach the United States market and of a toll-
free number as indicative of an intent to solicit responses from all jurisdictions within that mar-
ket. Id. at 720. 
 137. Id. at 721. See also Wisconsin v. Coeur D’Alene Tribe, No. 97-C-711-5 (W.D. Wis. 
Feb. 18, 1998) (unpublished). 
 138. State v. Beer Nuts, Ltd., No. ED 76192, 2000 WL 270671 (Mo. Ct. App. Mar. 14, 
2000). 
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nors. As part of the investigation, an 18-year-old state intern had ac-
cessed the Beer Nuts web site and ordered two six packs without be-
ing asked for any proof of age. Because, according to the record in 
the case, “Beer Nuts admittedly delivered thousands of bottles of 
beer into the State, pursuant to commercial relationships that Beer 
Nuts maintained with hundreds of Missouri residents,” the Court of 
Appeals found both purposeful availment and sufficient minimum 
contacts.139 In weighing traditional notions of fair play and substan-
tial justice, the Court found “that the interest of the State of Mis-
souri in regulating the sale and delivery of alcoholic beverages within 
its borders outweighs the burden that Beer Nuts bears in appearing 
as a party defendant in Missouri.”140 
From the standpoint of a state seeking to protect its citizens from 
impact of unlawful conduct on the Internet, the broad view of juris-
diction taken by the courts in Granite Gate and Beer Nuts is a posi-
tive development. In particular, the focus on the data showing the 
number of “hits” and responses between the web site and state resi-
dents, and the reliance on accumulation of prior e-contacts, sets a 
useful and quantifiable standard that could be helpful in cases where 
there are few other contacts between the forum and the web site. 
D. Web Technology as a Source of Facts to Establish Personal 
Jurisdiction 
A review of the federal and state case law on personal jurisdiction 
has demonstrated that few courts are willing to permit the exercise of 
jurisdiction over nonresidents simply based on the fact that the non-
resident has posted a web site which is accessible to the forum. 
Courts have almost universally required some additional proof of ei-
ther traditional commercial contacts or intentional direction of the 
activity toward the forum—a form of purposeful availment. Because 
some courts have allowed plaintiffs to conduct “jurisdictional discov-
ery” and have also occasionally found the web site’s records of forum 
visitors to be relevant, it would seem prudent for states seeking to 
enforce their laws against outlaw web sites to seek discovery of the  
 
 
 139. Id. at 7–8. 
 140. Id. at 8. The due weight given to the state’s interest in regulating alcohol was a fac-
tor missing in private actions against similar online beer distributors. See, e.g., Butler v. Beer 
Across Am., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (N.D. Ala. 2000), discussed, infra note 183. 
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web server logs in order to attempt to make a sufficient record as to 
the number of forum contacts.141 
From almost any web server, precise data can be culled indicating 
the originating Internet Protocol (“IP”) address of each computer 
that has connected to, or visited the site, the date and time of the 
visit, the number of visits, and even the activity, or “clicking” done 
during the visit. In some instances, if the IP address is permanently 
assigned to one computer, then that IP address can be associated 
with a particular location, and ultimately, to a specific jurisdiction.142 
In many cases, however, the logs will only record a visitor’s “dy-
namically-assigned” IP address, which actually is assigned to the user 
by his dial-up ISP, such as America Online (“AOL”).143 In those 
cases, the logs will show an IP address that is assigned computers lo-
cated at AOL in Virginia. Consequently, in the case of dynamically-
assigned IP addresses, the actual location of the visitor would not be 
shown in the web server logs. Additional records would have to be 
sought from the ISP to see which user was assigned that dynamic IP 
address on the date and time that it appeared in the web site logs. 
Unfortunately for investigators and litigators, the records pertaining 
to dynamically assigned IP addresses are normally not retained by 
ISPs for more than a few days. If for some reason such records are 
logged by the ISP’s system, then they will be available. 
If the web site requires users to register and provide personal in-
formation, such as their names and addresses, these records can be 
used to develop a profile of the web site’s traffic. Although unveri-
fied registration information may be viewed with skepticism given 
the ease with which it can be fabricated by the user, where reliable, 
 
 141. Web servers are record-making wizards, which can be programmed to log and save 
reams of information regarding the traffic that visits web sites. For a detailed discussion of how 
web server technology tracks visitors, see Philip Greenspun, User Tracking (visited Nov. 25, 
2000) <http://www.photo.net/wtr/thebook/user-tracking.html>. 
 142. A static IP address may actually be assigned to a particular computer in one location, 
or it may be assigned to a service provider who then allows a customer to use it. Consequently, 
the IP address, even if static, may show the location of the provider rather than the physical 
location of the user. The next step for the investigator, or litigator, is to seek the subscriber 
information for that IP address from the service provider. That information will usually lead to 
a physical location of the computer. 
 143. A dynamically-assigned IP address could be compared to a number given to a shop-
per in line at the butcher. The number is assigned by the ISP because it is part of what is neces-
sary for a computer to communicate over the Internet. The number is assigned to the user dur-
ing his Internet session; then, after the session is complete, the number is re-used by the ISP 
just like the numbers at the butcher shop. 
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such records can clearly show where a web site is having the biggest 
impact. Because Internet companies normally track this information 
and use it for marketing purposes or to derive other commercial ad-
vantages, it would not be unreasonable for a court to conclude that a 
company which knowingly continued to interact with a large number 
of residents of a certain state through repeated contacts over the 
Internet for a long period of time had purposefully availed itself of 
the privileges of that state forum. As states continue to face the need 
to protect their consumers from a variety of scams and other unlaw-
ful conduct on the Internet, attorneys general and other officials can 
be expected to continue to push the outward limits of personal juris-
diction: the records available on web server logs may give them some 
data to support that push. 
II. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF STATE CRIMINAL 
JURISDICTION 
Just as the Internet increases the possibility that states will need 
to bring civil actions against out-of-state parties, it also presents new 
and difficult challenges for state criminal law enforcement.144 The 
mainstreaming of the Internet means that more and more frequently, 
local law enforcement authorities will find themselves confronted 
with citizen complaints of crimes by perpetrators who are not located 
within their jurisdiction.145 Although large-scale crimes and matters 
 
 144. As Attorney General Janet Reno recently pointed out in discussing the issue of 
unlawful conduct on the Internet: 
There is a dark side. A dark side in terms of traditional crime, of threats, child por-
nography, fraud, gambling, stalking, and extortion. They are all crimes that, when 
perpetrated via the Internet, can reach a larger and more accessible pool of victims, 
and can transform local scams into crimes that encircle the globe. By connecting a 
worldwide network of users, the Internet has made it easier for wrongdoers to find 
each other, to congregate, to socialize, and to create an online community of sup-
port and social reinforcement for their antisocial behaviors. 
Reno Remarks of January 10, 2000, supra note 2. 
 145. Id. See also The Electronic Frontier: The Challenge of Unlawful Conduct Involving the 
Use of the Internet: A Report of the President’s Working Group on Unlawful Conduct on the 
Internet: March 2000 (visited Sept. 14, 2000) <http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/ 
unlawful.htm> [hereinafter “The President’s Report”]. The interagency report explained: 
In responding to the challenge of law enforcement on the Internet, one of the prob-
lems that state and local governments face is that, although the crimes and schemes 
on the Internet may victimize local populations, the medium over which these 
crimes are committed permits a defendant to be located anywhere in the world. 
Id. 
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of national or international importance will usually call federal law 
enforcement resources into play,146 state and local authorities will 
undoubtedly be called upon to respond to citizen complaints of 
Internet crime which fall within their traditional areas of primary re-
sponsibility.147 
The Internet will cause states to confront the legal limits of their 
ability to exercise extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction over perpetra-
tors located outside their territorial boundaries. As they attempt to 
carry out their duties to prosecute these cases, state authorities will 
find support in the case law holding that: (1) the exercise of limited 
extraterritorial jurisdiction by state courts over conduct occurring 
outside of state boundaries has been approved by the Supreme Court 
since 1911;148 and (2) subsequent codification of state statutes au-
thorizing extraterritorial jurisdiction can further expand the reach of 
such jurisdiction.149 
A. Case Law Supporting State Extraterritorial Criminal 
Jurisdiction 
At common law, criminal jurisdiction was based on the territorial 
 
 146. The President’s Report categorized into eight areas the predominant types of Inter-
net crime. Of these eight areas of online unlawful activity, five are traditional offenses or regu-
lated conduct in which state and local authorities already carry a heavy enforcement 
responsibility: fraud, child pornography, sales of prescription drugs and controlled substances, 
gambling, and alcohol. The other three areas are ones in which the federal government has 
played a predominant enforcement role: sale of firearms, securities fraud, and software piracy 
and intellectual property theft. See id. at app. B–I (describing categories of Internet crimes). 
 147. In Mesa v. California the Supreme Court reiterated the preeminent responsibility of 
states in the field of criminal law enforcement: 
[U]nder our federal system, it goes without saying that preventing and dealing with 
crime is much more the business of the States than it is of the Federal Government. 
Because the regulation of crime is pre-eminently a matter for the States, we have 
identified a strong judicial policy against federal interference with state criminal pro-
ceedings. 
489 U.S. 121, 138 (1989) (citing Arizona v. Manypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 243 (1981)) (cita-
tions and internal quotations omitted). 
 148. See Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 284–85 (1911) (reversing grant of habeas 
corpus for a defendant who was not present in the forum state at the time the crime of solicita-
tion of a bribe occurred). 
 149. See, e.g., N.Y. Crim. Proc. § 20.20(2)(a)–(d) (2000) (adopting a broad rule allowing 
jurisdiction where a criminal offense “was a result offense and the result occurred within this 
state,” or “[t]he statute defining the offense is designed to prevent the occurrence of a particu-
lar effect in this state and the conduct constituting the offense committed was performed with 
intent that it would have such effect herein . . . ”). 
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principle, which provided that if the crime occurred within the physi-
cal borders of a state then that state would have jurisdiction to 
prosecute the defendant.150 Indeed, the general rule that a state 
could not prosecute an individual for a crime committed outside its 
boundaries was accepted as “axiomatic” and “too deeply embedded 
in our law to require justification.”151 This theory of jurisdiction de-
veloped problems in application, however, such as “the very unrea-
sonable principle” propounded in “[t]he ancient common law . . . 
that, if a person be wounded in one county, and die in another, his 
murderer could be tried in neither . . . because the offense was not 
complete in either county.”152 The law developed fictions to deal 
with this anomaly, such as the doctrine of constructive presence, 
which held that the offender putting an action in motion, such as the 
firing of a bullet, remains constructively present with the action until 
it is completed.153 In more recent times, the law has recognized three 
primary bases for justifying extraterritorial jurisdiction: (1) the com-
mon law detrimental effects test; (2) the “omission” theory; and (3) 
statutory grants of power which codify a form of either or both juris-
dictional bases. These three bases will now be discussed. 
1. The “detrimental effects” test 
Justice Holmes’ 1911 decision for the United States Supreme 
Court in Strassheim v. Daily154 offered a clear statement of the “det-
rimental effects” test for extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction. In 
Strassheim, the Supreme Court held that “[a]cts done outside a ju-
risdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental ef-
fects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause of the harm as if  
 
 
 150. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 180 (1972). The 
theory was that each crime had only one situs or location, and the place of the situs would have 
jurisdiction. 
 151. See In re Vasquez, 705 N.E.2d 606, 610 (Mass. 1999) (citing DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, 
Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 
92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 318 (1992)). 
 152. See State v. Smith, 421 N.W.2d 315, 318 (Minn. 1988) (quoting Ex parte McNeely, 
14 S.E. 436, 436–37 (W. Va. 1892)). 
 153. See People v. Blume, 443 Mich. 476, 500 n.12 (Mich. 1993) (Boyle, J. dissenting) 
(quoting Simpson v. State, 17 S.E. 984 (1893) (“So if a man in the State of South Carolina 
criminally fires a ball into the State of Georgia, the law regards him as accompanying the ball, 
and as being represented by it, up to the point where it strikes. . . .”)). 
 154. 221 U.S. 280 (1911). 
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he had been present at the effect, if the state should succeed in get-
ting him within its power.”155 
In Strassheim, the Supreme Court clarified the theoretical under-
pinnings of a state’s power to exercise criminal jurisdiction over con-
duct occurring outside the state’s territorial boundaries. To satisfy 
the Supreme Court’s minimum requirement for an exercise of juris-
diction over out-of-state conduct, there must be an act occurring 
outside the state which is (1) intended to produce detrimental effects 
within the state, and (2) causes detrimental effects within the state.156 
In contrast to the cases arising in the context of in personam civil 
jurisdiction, several criminal cases have specifically noted that the 
“minimum contacts” analysis required in civil cases is irrelevant and 
does not apply when determining whether an exercise of criminal ju-
risdiction is proper.157 Consequently, factual inquiry into the nature 
and quality of the contacts between the defendant and the forum, as 
well as the other factors discussed above in the analysis of personal 
jurisdiction cases, are immaterial in criminal cases. In criminal cases, 
the factual questions at issue under the detrimental effects test are 
the defendant’s act, his intent in causing the detrimental effects in 
the forum state, and the effects themselves. 
While articulating a useful general test, the Strassheim Court did 
not discuss it at length. Courts have needed to flesh out the contours 
of the precise state of mind or level of intent required on the part of 
 
 155. Id. at 285. The defendant in Strassheim offered to pay over $1000 to the warden of 
the State Prison in Jackson, Michigan, if the warden would agree to take used machinery in 
lieu of new as required on a state contract. The bribe offer was made while the defendant was 
outside of Michigan, though he had been in Michigan at various times in connection with the 
contract. 
 156. See, e.g., In re Vasquez, 705 N.E.2d 606 (Mass. 1999). 
 157. See, e.g., id. at 608–09 (citing Rios v. State, 733 P.2d 242, 244 (Wyo. 1987)) (hold-
ing that minimum contacts analysis has no application in criminal cases); Ex parte Boetscher, 
812 S.W.2d 600, 602 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991) (finding no case applying a Kulko-type minimum 
contacts analysis to criminal jurisdiction); State v. Luv Pharmacy, Inc., 388 A.2d 190 (N.H. 
1978) (holding that application of minimum contacts analysis questionable); see also State v. 
Amoroso, 975 P.2d 505, 508 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (collecting cases and stating that “the rule 
is well-settled that civil ‘minimum contacts’ analysis has no place in determining whether a 
state may assert criminal personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant”). Noting that the 
United States Supreme Court has held that it did not violate the Constitution to exercise juris-
diction where a defendant had been kidnapped and brought to a jurisdiction by illegal force, 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court made it clear that “[t]he jurisprudence of personal 
jurisdiction has no bearing on the question whether a person may be brought to a State and 
tried there for crimes under that State’s laws.” In re Vasquez, 705 N.E. 2d at 609 (citing Fris-
bie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952)). 
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the out-of-state defendant who causes the detrimental effect. The 
Michigan Supreme Court in People v. Blume, for example, found no 
basis for jurisdiction over a Florida drug co-conspirator who had sold 
cocaine to a Michigan resident because there was insufficient proof 
that the Florida resident had intended that the cocaine be distributed 
in Michigan.158 The Blume Court interpreted Strassheim as requiring 
both “specific intent to act and the intent that the harm occur in 
Michigan.” Proof that the defendant knew that the person to whom 
he sold the cocaine was from Michigan and would return there was 
not considered sufficient to show that the defendant intended the 
cocaine to be sold in Michigan.159 Other courts have focused less on 
the defendant’s intent to cause the detrimental effect within the state 
than on the fact that the defendant’s act caused a result in the forum 
state which is a crime or an element of a crime.160 
Ironically, the first state Supreme Court to consider an assertion 
of criminal territorial jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant in 
an Internet fraud case did not apply, or even cite, the Strassheim case. 
In State v. Cain,161 the highest court in Maryland, the Court of Ap-
peals, reversed and remanded the lower court’s opinion finding no 
jurisdiction over a Georgia resident who refused to refund six thou-
sand one hundred forty dollars paid by a Maryland doll-collector 
who was sent a set of thirty-six Barbie dolls in poor condition that 
had been represented over the Internet to be a set of ninety-five Bar-
bie dolls in “mint” condition. The Maryland Court declined to apply 
the detrimental effects test because it found that an essential element 
 
 158. Blume, 505 N.W.2d at 851 n.28. 
 159. Id. at 850–51. The Blume decision was largely governed by its facts, i.e., the lack of 
any proof that the defendant agreed with the objects of the overall conspiracy, or intended to 
affect the forum. The Court made it clear that proof of a continuing drug supplier relationship, 
or repeated conduct, or knowledge of the co-defendant’s intent would “certainly” have meant 
a different outcome. Id. at n.30. But c.f. Moreno v. Baskerville, 452 S.E.2d 653, 654–55 (Va. 
1995) (holding that even where defendant knew that drugs sold in Arizona were bound for 
Virginia, jurisdiction was not established as to distribution charges because “immediate result” 
of drug sale to intermediary occurred in Arizona, and intermediary sold them to a person in 
Virginia). 
 160. See, e.g., State v. Doyen, 676 A.2d 345, 350 (Vt. 1996) (finding jurisdiction where 
defendant failed to return child to custodial parent in Vermont because act had result in forum 
which was a crime); Rios, 733 P.2d at 242 (holding that failure to return child to forum state 
had effect there); Keselica v. Commonwealth, S.E.2d 756, 760 (Va. Ct. App. 1997) (holding 
that a Maryland defendant’s fraud scheme amenable to Virginia jurisdiction because defendant 
put in motion a criminal scheme the immediate result of which caused the intended harm in 
the forum state). 
 161. No. 140 Sept. Term 1999, 2000 WL 1036286 (Md. July 28, 2000). 
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of the crime of theft by deception occurred in Maryland.  The de-
fendant’s obtaining control of the property could be proven to have 
occurred in Maryland at the time when the victim deposited her 
check in the mail in Maryland. The Court thus did not directly ad-
dress the question of whether jurisdiction could be had where the 
elements occurred elsewhere, but the intended effects of the crime 
occurred in the forum state. The opinion clearly implies, however, 
that if all of the essential elements of a crime occur outside Mary-
land, then the occurrence of detrimental effects within Maryland, 
whether intended or not, would not be sufficient under that state’s 
common law to provide a basis of jurisdiction.162 
As will be seen in the discussion below dealing with state statutes 
conferring extraterritorial jurisdiction, some statutes expressly allow 
the state to exercise criminal jurisdiction only if the intended result 
that occurs in the forum is an element of the crime,163 while others 
will allow jurisdiction when an offense has a harmful impact in the 
forum, even though that result is not necessarily an element of the 
offense.164 Regardless of the different weight that jurisdictions may 
give to the intent or whether the in-state effect must be an element 
of the crime or merely a result, the detrimental effects test remains 
the touchstone of much of the state jurisprudence on extraterritorial 
jurisdiction. 
2. The “omission” theory 
Many of the state cases addressing the issue of extraterritorial 
criminal jurisdiction arise in the context of child-custody or non-
support disputes in which one parent absconds with the child to an-
other jurisdiction in violation of the custodial rights of the first par-
ent, or fails to comply with child support obligations.  Then the state 
of the first parent files criminal charges against the out-of-state ab-
 
 162. See id. 
 163. See, e.g., Lane v. State, 388 So.2d 1022, 1027 (Fla. 1980) (applying Florida jurisdic-
tional statute allowing jurisdiction where an element of the crime occurs in the forum or a re-
sult of the offense that is an element occurs in the forum). 
 164. See, e.g., People v. Sandy, 666 N.Y.S.2d 565 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (holding that 
intent to have harmful impact in forum plus consequences in the forum confer jurisdiction un-
der New York jurisdiction statute even where consequences—unavailability of evidence which 
had been subpoenaed by the grand jury—were not elements of the crime); State v. Miller, 755 
P.2d 434 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (limiting effect of Arizona statute allowing jurisdiction if the 
“result” of an element of an offense committed outside the state occurs within the state). 
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sconder or deadbeat.165 These cases frequently discuss the jurisdic-
tional basis which arises from the omission or failure to act under cir-
cumstances in which there is a legal duty to act.166 
Under this theory, if a crime consists of the omission or failure to 
comply with a legal duty, proper jurisdiction may be had in the place 
where the omitted legal duty is required to be performed.167 In the 
child custody cases, the situs of the crime is considered the state 
where the custodian obligation arose. Although these custody cases 
frequently discuss the omission theory, they also rely heavily on the 
detrimental effects analysis, as well as any applicable state statutes re-
garding state jurisdiction. 
Another example cited as a crime of omission is the failure to file 
a tax return.168 This basis of jurisdiction is an independent ground 
upon which to seek extraterritorial jurisdiction, in addition to the 
detrimental effects test, though frequently it is discussed as an alter-
native basis. 
3. State statutes authorizing extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction 
Many state legislatures have enacted jurisdictional statutes169 
 
 165. See, e.g., In re Vasquez, 705 N.E.2d 606, 610 (Mass. 1999) (finding jurisdiction 
and collecting cases); State v. Doyen, 676 A.2d 345, 347 (finding jurisdiction); Trindle v. 
State, 602 A.2d 1232, 1236–37 (Ct. App. Md. 1992) (finding jurisdiction); State v. Kane, 625 
A.2d 1361, 1363 (R.I. 1993) (finding jurisdiction); Ex parte Boetscher, 812 S.W.2d 600, 603 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (finding jurisdiction); Wheat v. Alaska, 734 P.2d 1007, 1012 (Alaska 
Ct. App. 1987) (finding jurisdiction); Rios, 733 P.2d at 250 (finding jurisdiction). But see Peo-
ple v. Gerchberg, 131 Cal. App. 3d 618 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (finding no jurisdiction); State v. 
McCormick, 273 N.W.2d 624, 627 (Minn. 1978) (finding no jurisdiction); State v. Cochran, 
538 P.2d 791 (Idaho 1975) (finding no jurisdiction). 
 166. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 282–
83 (1986). 
 167. See, e.g., In re Vasquez, 705 N.E.2d at 611, (collecting cases); Doyen, 676 A.2d at 
347, State v. Gantt, 548 N.W.2d 134 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996); State v. McGill, 836 P.2d 1371, 
1373 (Or. Ct. App. 1992). 
 168. See, e.g., Doyen, 676 A.2d at 347. 
 169. For an non-exhaustive list of state statutes that establish bases for extraterritorial 
criminal jurisdiction, see, ALA. CODE § 15-2-4 (1999); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-108 (1999); 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-104 (1999); CAL. PENAL CODE § 778 (West 1999); COLO. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 18-1-201 (1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 204 (1999); FLA. STAT. ANN.  
§ 910.005 (West 1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-2-1 (1999); HAW. REV. STAT. § 701-106 
(1999); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. Tit. 5/1-5 (West 1998); IND. CODE § 35-41-1-1 (1999); 
IOWA CODE ANN. § 803.1 (West 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3104 (1998); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 500.060 (Banks-Baldwin 1998); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 7 (West 1999); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.025 (West 1999); MO. REV. STAT. § 541.191 (1999); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 46-2-101 (1999); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 625:4 (1999); N.J. STAT. ANN.  
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codifying the bases of jurisdiction similar to the detrimental effects 
test set out in Strassheim, the omission theory, the Model Penal 
Code (“MPC”),170 or extending their jurisdictional reach even fur-
ther.171 Most of the statutes cited track the MPC’s language or 
 
§ 2C:1-3 (West 1999); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 20.20 (McKinney 1999); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 2901.11 (Anderson 1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 131.215 (1998); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN. § 102 (West 1999); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-16-2 S.D.C.L. (Michie 1999); TEX. 
PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.04 (West 1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-201 (1999); WIS. STAT. 
ANN. § 939.03 (West 1999). 
 170. THE MODEL PENAL CODE, § 1.03, provides as follows: 
§ 1.03. Territorial Applicability. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this Section, a person may be convicted under 
the law of this State of an offense committed by his own conduct or the conduct of 
another for which he is legally accountable if: 
(a)  either the conduct which is an element of the offense or the result which is 
such an element occurs within this State; or 
(b) conduct occurring outside the State is sufficient under the law of this State 
to constitute an attempt to commit an offense within the State; or 
   (c)  conduct occurring outside the State is sufficient under the law of this State 
to constitute a conspiracy to commit an offense within the State and an overt 
act in furtherance of such conspiracy occurs within the State; or 
   (d) conduct occurring within the State establishes complicity in the commis-
sion of, or an attempt, solicitation or conspiracy to commit, an offense in an-
other jurisdiction which also is an offense under the law of this State; or 
(e) the offense consists of the omission to perform a legal duty imposed by the 
law of the State with respect to domicile, residence or a relationship to a per-
son, thing or transaction in the State; or 
   (f) the offense is based on a statute of this State which expressly prohibits con-
duct outside the State, when the conduct bears a reasonable relation to a le-
gitimate interest of this State and the actor knows or should know that his 
conduct is likely to affect that interest. 
 (2) Subsection (1)(a) does not apply when either causing a specified result or a pur-
pose to cause or danger of causing such a result is an element of an offense and the 
result occurs or is designed or likely to occur only in another jurisdiction where the 
conduct charged would not constitute an offense, unless a legislative purpose plainly 
appears to declare the conduct criminal regardless of the place of the result. 
(3) Subsection (1)(a) does not apply when causing a particular result is an element 
of an offense and the result is caused by conduct occurring outside the State which 
would not constitute an offense if the result had occurred there, unless the actor 
purposely or knowingly caused the result within the State. 
(4)  When the offense is homicide, either the death of the victim or the bodily im-
pact causing death constitutes a “result,” within the meaning of Subsection (1)(a) 
and if the body of a homicide victim is found within the State, it is presumed that 
such result occurred within the State. 
(5)  This State includes the land and water and the air space above such land and 
water with respect to which the State has legislative jurisdiction. 
Id. 
 171. State v. Miller, 755 P.2d 434, 435 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988). In Miller, the Arizona 
Court of Appeals explained that Arizona’s jurisdictional statute was broader than the Model 
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adopted similar language, to the effect that, for the state to exercise 
jurisdiction over an offense occurring partly outside the state, either 
an element of the offense or a result of the offense—which is also an 
element—must occur within the forum state. The states that have 
adopted this kind of language include Colorado, Delaware, Florida, 
Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Minne-
sota, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Ohio, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, Texas, and Utah. States which have broadened the Model 
Penal Code approach by also allowing jurisdiction where a result of 
the offense, whether an element or not, occurs in the forum state, 
are Arizona, Kansas, New York, and Missouri.172 
Wisconsin’s statute permits jurisdiction even if no result occurs in 
the state, but the out-of-state person “does an act with intent that it 
cause in this state a consequence set forth in a section defining a 
crime.”173 Alabama, California, and South Dakota have statutes 
which establish jurisdiction where an offense is commenced outside a 
state and “consummated” within the state.174 Ohio and Mississippi 
both have jurisdictional statutes that specifically target computer or 
Internet-related crime.175 The Ohio statute creates a new basis of ju-
risdiction whenever a person “by means of a computer, computer 
system, computer network, [etc.] . . . causes or knowingly permits 
any writing, data, image, or other telecommunication to be dissemi-
nated or transmitted into this state in violation of the law of this 
state.”176 Although Ohio’s statute may require some judicial inter-
pretation in order to know what it means for data to be transmitted 
into the state “in violation of the law of this state” (i.e., does the 
transmission have to be an element of the offense, a complete of-
fense, or the result of an offense?), the statute certainly appears to be 
aimed at ensuring jurisdiction in the common panoply of Internet 
 
Penal Code. While the Model Penal Code would allow jurisdiction only when a result which is 
an element of the offense occurs in the forum state, Arizona’s statute would allow jurisdiction 
where the conduct constituting the element of the offenses occurred outside the State, but the 
result of that conduct occurred within the State. Id. at 438–39. 
 172. For a discussion of state case law discussing the application of many of these statutes, 
see Rios v. State, 733 P.2d 242, 247–49 (Wyo. 1987) (collecting cases). 
 173. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.03(c) (West 1999). 
 174. ALA. CODE § 15-2-4 (1999); CAL. PENAL CODE § 778 (West 1999); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-16-2 (Michie 1999). 
 175. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.11 (Anderson 1999); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-45-
11 (1999) (governing “venue” for computer crimes). 
 176. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2901.11 (Anderson 1999). 
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crimes such as fraudulent web sites, online child pornography, and 
Internet sales of contraband. Whether a statute such as Ohio’s actu-
ally extends state jurisdiction any further than the Strassheim detri-
mental effects test or the MPC approach will need to await judicial 
interpretation. 
Courts have suggested that the state’s power to exercise extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction is an inherent authority reserved to the states pur-
suant to the Tenth Amendment.177 Moreover, as Strassheim made 
clear, a state does not need to have a statute explicitly defining extra-
territorial reach in order to exercise such jurisdiction.178 Comparing 
the common law grounds for exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction 
and the statutes of several states, it is arguable that the common law 
rule of Strassheim is both narrower and broader than some of the 
statutory grants of authority. 
Strassheim requires (1) an intent to produce detrimental effects 
within the forum, and (2) detrimental effects in the forum. The in-
tent requirement is not found in most of the state statutes,179 and in 
this sense, Strassheim confers jurisdiction in a narrower band of cases. 
However, Strassheim is also broader than state statutes because it 
would allow jurisdiction as long as detrimental effects were produced 
in the forum, regardless of whether these effects were an element of 
the offense committed. Most of the state statutes, in contrast, re-
quire that the conduct constituting an element of the offense, a re-
sult that is itself an element, or a result of an element occur within 
the state. The question arises whether states with jurisdictional stat-
utes can nevertheless rely on common law grounds to establish extra-
 
 177. U.S. CONST. amend. X. The Tenth Amendment provides: “The powers not dele-
gated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved 
to the States respectively, or to the people.” See also State v. Miller, 755 P.2d 434, 436 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. 1988); Rios, 733 P.2d at 249. 
 178. See Rios, 733 P.2d at 249 (“While Wyoming does not have a specific statute which 
permits the exercise of jurisdiction when extraterritorial conduct causes a result in this state, 
the concept articulated in Strassheim v. Dailey . . . does not depend on the existence of such a 
statute.”). 
 179. Some states have adopted criminal statutes aimed at unlawful conduct on the Inter-
net that include jurisdictional grants of authority within the criminal statute. For example, 
Michigan’s criminal statute prohibiting the use of a computer to commit certain crimes in-
cludes a provision stating that “a violation or attempted violation of this section occurs if the 
communication originates in this state, is intended to terminate in this state, or is intended to 
terminate with a person who is in this state.” MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.145d(6). This appears 
to be a broader grant of jurisdiction than Strassheim, as it does not require that a detrimental 
effect occur within the state. 
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territorial jurisdiction. At least one court has held that, unless ex-
pressly abrogated, the common law basis for jurisdiction survives and 
may provide jurisdiction.180 
B. Cybercrime Prosecutions Involving State Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction 
Other than the Maryland case discussed above,181 state courts 
have not rendered many decisions regarding state assertions of extra-
territorial jurisdiction in cases charging cybercrimes.182 Our examina-
tion of the non-cyber case law and statutes demonstrates, however, 
that state law currently would support an aggressive response to 
Internet-related unlawful activities which impact on a particular state, 
even if the perpetrator is not physically located within the forum 
state. Recently, states have engaged in criminal and civil enforcement 
actions against online distributors of alcohol and prescription drugs, 
as well as child pornography and child sexual predators.183 
 
 180. State v. Doyen, 676 A.2d 345, 350 (1996). 
 181. See State v. Cain, No. 140 Sept. Term 1999, 2000 WL 1036286 (Md. July 28, 
2000) (finding jurisdiction on narrow grounds in Internet fraud case, where Georgia defendant 
failed to deliver the number and quality of ordered “Barbie” dolls, and the court found that 
element of obtaining control of the victim’s property occurred in the forum state when the 
victim placed the check in the mail in the forum jurisdiction). 
 182. Indeed, research has located few other reported state decisions involving criminal 
activity over the Internet. Most of the reported cases relate to the transmission of child por-
nography over the Internet, or sexual solicitation of children over the Internet, but do not di-
rectly address jurisdictional issues. See, e.g., People v. Foley, 692 N.Y.S.2d 248 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1999), aff’d, 731 N.E.2d 123 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2000) (affirming conviction for Internet dis-
semination of indecent material to minors, and upholding the constitutionality of state stat-
ute); People v. Barrows, 709 N.Y.S.2d 573 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (holding as constitutional 
the dissemination statute, following the Foley case, and rejecting Commerce Clause preemption 
and extraterritoriality challenge because defendant’s “purposeful” acts demonstrated intent to 
commit crime in New York); Greer v. Texas, 999 S.W.2d 484 (Tex. App. 1999), cert. denied, 
2000 LEXIS 5927 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2000) (holding that computer image of child pornography 
did not meet statutory definition of “film image” then in effect and could not be basis of pro-
bation violation, though other basis found); People v. Munn, 688 N.Y.S.2d 384 (N.Y. Crim. 
Ct. 1999) (denying motion to dismiss charge of aggravated harassment based on Internet 
newsgroup posting of solicitation to murder police officer); Janjua v. State, 991 S.W.2d 419 
(Tex. App. 1999) (finding computer to be forfeitable “criminal instruments” in the context of 
conviction for promoting child pornography); State v. Duke, 709 So. 2d 580, 582 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1998) (holding that in-state defendant’s explicit sexual solicitation of undercover offi-
cer in chatroom, plus attendance at planned tryst insufficient evidence to prove attempted sex-
ual battery). 
 183. States have taken action recently in several areas, including civil enforcement actions 
involving online pharmacies (Kansas and Michigan), online sales of alcohol to minors (Massa-
chusetts, Michigan, and Missouri), sales of unlawful kits to manufacture controlled substances 
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Because online sales of regulated items such as alcohol, drugs, 
and tobacco present a typical area in which state criminal actions may 
arise, a recent Utah decision in a prosecution of an online beer dis-
tributor presents an analogous setting.184 In Amoroso, the state filed 
misdemeanor charges against Beer Across America (“BAA”) and its 
president arising out of the sale of beer to minors. The trial court 
granted defendant’s motion to dismiss the charges for lack of juris-
diction, but the court of appeals reversed. The appellate court found 
the civil “minimum contacts” analysis to be inapplicable and applied 
Utah’s criminal jurisdiction statute, and the Strassheim analysis.185 Al-
though the defendant shipped the alcohol from Illinois, the court 
found that: 
BAA is subject to prosecution in Utah for conduct committed in Il-
linois because its conduct caused an unlawful result in Utah. In 
sum, the information alleges conduct that resulted in unlawful im-
portation of alcohol into Utah; unlawful sale or supply of alcohol in 
Utah; unlawful warehousing, distribution, or transportation of al-
cohol to Utah; unlawful supplying of alcohol to persons within 
Utah; and unlawful distribution or transportation for sale or resale 
to retail customers in Utah without a license.186 
Unfortunately, the Amoroso court did not offer a summary of the 
facts, which were referenced as alleged in affidavits but were not re-
counted in the opinion; so, it is unclear whether the case involved 
Internet sales of alcohol. Nevertheless, the case offers support for the 
conclusion that an out-of-state supplier of regulated items may be 
prosecuted by the forum based on what appears to be a single course 
of conduct involving the shipment of items to the forum state.187 
 
(Michigan), Internet gambling (New York, Minnesota, and Wisconsin), and child sexual ex-
ploitation (many states). See, e.g., Michigan Targets Internet Alcohol Sales to Minors, Reaches 
Agreement with UPS, 5 ELECTRONIC COM. & L. REP. 173, 192 (Feb. 23, 2000). 
 184. State v. Amoroso, 975 P.2d 505 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
 185. Id. at 508. 
 186. Id. at 509. 
 187. The fact that Amoroso was a criminal prosecution, where minimum contacts analysis 
was irrelevant, may have been decisive. See Butler v. Beer Across Am., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1261 
(N.D. Ala. 2000) (granting defendant’s motion to dismiss in civil action based on lack of 
minimum contacts where Alabama plaintiff’s son, a minor, ordered and received beer over the 
Internet). In addition to finding no minimum contacts because the web site did not anticipate 
the regular exchange of information across the Internet, and other contacts with the forum 
were slight, the district court in Butler also found that, under both states’ versions of the Uni-
form Commercial Code (“UCC”), the “sale” of the beer actually occurred in Illinois. Id. at 
1267–68. For this reason, the Butler Court found that jurisdiction did lie in the home state of 
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In summary, the case law and statutory authority providing for 
extraterritorial criminal jurisdiction suggest that states will be suc-
cessful in prosecuting out-of-state defendants who victimize their 
populations using the technology of the Internet if they can either 
(1) show intent to cause detrimental effects within the forum state 
and detrimental effects within the state, or (2) meet the require-
ments of the relevant criminal jurisdiction statute. A showing of 
minimum contacts will not be required for criminal prosecutions of 
conduct over the Internet. 
III.  INVESTIGATIVE CHALLENGES TO STATES ENFORCING THE 
LAW IN CYBERSPACE 
States seeking to carry out their traditional enforcement role in 
cyberspace will not only confront recurring questions of how to es-
tablish jurisdiction over nonresidents in civil and criminal actions, 
they will also face new, unique and daunting challenges in gathering 
the evidence necessary to bring such actions.188 States will need new 
procedural tools because, as individuals increasingly choose the 
Internet as a medium of social interaction and commerce,189 they 
utilize a technology that presents jurisdictional challenges to law en-
forcement which do not exist in any like degree in real world transac-
tions. In this section, we will examine two criminal-friendly aspects 
of the Internet that are not found in the brick and mortar world and 
 
Beer Across America and transferred the case to Illinois. When states are attempting to bring 
actions against nonresident merchants, this UCC-driven analysis can be significant, as Con-
necticut found in State v. Cardwell, 718 A.2d 954, 959 (Conn. 1998). In Cardwell, the Con-
necticut Attorney General brought an unfair trade practices case against an out-of-state com-
pany for “ticket scalping.” Although in-state residents had bought tickets from the defendant, 
the Supreme Court of Connecticut applied the UCC definition of “sale,” which did not re-
quire the seller to deliver the goods because of the contract, but allowed them to be sent, 
meant that the “sale” occurred at the time and place of shipment, not delivery. Thus the Card-
well Court found that the defendant did not “sell” tickets in Connecticut. 
 188. Attorney General Janet Reno drew attention to this challenge in her speech to the 
NAAG when she called for “new and more robust procedural tools to allow state authorities to 
more easily gather information located outside their jurisdictional boundaries.” Reno Remarks 
of January 10, 2000, supra note 2. 
 189. According to a report by the Stanford Institute for the Quantitative Study of Society 
released on February 17, 2000, 55 percent of the American population has access to the Inter-
net either at home or at work. The report examined Internet use and concluded that, “for the 
most part, the Internet today is a giant public library with a decidedly commercial tilt.” See 
Norman H. Nie & Lutz Erbring, Internet and Society: A Preliminary Report (visited Nov. 25, 
2000) <http://www.stanford.edu/group/siqss/Press_Release/Preliminary_Report.pdf>. 
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that have specific consequences which affect the ability of law en-
forcement to conduct investigations. After examining these conse-
quences, we will consider possible law enforcement fixes intended to 
level the playing field. 
A. A “Borderless” Cyber-world Meets the Real World of Territorial 
Jurisdiction: Problems and Possible Solutions 
Wrong doers seeking to victimize people over the Internet have 
the world as their oyster. Any minor-league scam artist with an at-
tractive web site can suddenly reach a world-wide pool of victims.190 
This gives criminals an opportunity to ply their craft remotely, and to 
harm a set of victims in one locality from miles, or perhaps conti-
nents away. From the perspective of state law enforcement, this pre-
sents serious challenges because the evidence relating to the crime 
may be physically located in the same remote location where the 
perpetrator is, or, even more problematic, in one or more other re-
mote locations outside of the jurisdiction of the victims. Even dis-
counting the international issues presented by this problem, from the 
standpoint of the state governments, the same problem can exist if 
the target of the investigation is located outside the territorial 
boundaries of the state (which, in Internet cases, is likely to be the 
case). States rely upon investigative or grand jury subpoenas to 
gather evidence, which are essentially court orders. Such court orders 
normally are not enforceable outside the state’s jurisdictional 
boundaries.191  
The President’s Working Group Report on Unlawful Conduct 
on the Internet articulated this problem well: 
[I]f a fraud scheme is committed against Ohio residents by an op-
erator of a web site located in Florida, and the Ohio prosecutors is-
sue a subpoena for records from the company in Florida, there is 
currently no formal procedural mechanism for the service and en-
forcement of that subpoena. Although the Ohio prosecutors may 
informally succeed in obtaining assistance from the Florida authori-
ties, this is a matter of professional courtesy rather than legal proc-
ess. There is no guarantee that the subpoena will be served, or, if 
 
 190. See Reno Remarks of January 10, 2000, supra note 2. 
 191. See, e.g., Brennick v. Hynes, 414 N.Y.S.2d 777 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979) (holding that 
out-of-state corporation not required to respond to state grand jury subpoenas duces tecum 
issued in other state). 
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served, enforced. Running into such a roadblock could well mean 
the end of the Ohio investigation. In the absence of any ability to 
investigate the case themselves, it remains possible for the Ohio 
prosecutors simply to refer the case to their Florida counterparts by 
reporting their complaints about the cybercriminal in Florida, but if 
the crime involves no Florida victims or is otherwise outside its ju-
risdiction, there is no guarantee that the case will be investigated by 
anyone.192 
The structure of the Internet and the proliferation of telecom-
munications methods and providers makes this problem even more 
acute in two ways. First, states must not only deal with collecting 
evidence about the perpetrator where he or she is located, they also 
must determine where the perpetrator’s ISP, or web site-hosting ser-
vice, or free email service provider is located and may also need com-
pulsory process to gather evidence from these third-party providers. 
Second, in state cases where court-ordered electronic surveillance or 
wiretapping is being utilized, the phenomenon of satellite telephone 
communications providers (sometimes foreign-owned) means that 
the ground station where a communications signal needs to be inter-
cepted may be physically located outside of the jurisdiction issuing 
the wiretap order.193 The bottom line is that, in Internet cases, rele-
vant, material, and perhaps crucial, evidence of crimes affecting local 
citizens can be located anywhere in the world, but the state’s ability 
to reach that evidence does not extend so far. A careful examination 
of proposed remedies for this problem would serve as the topic for a 
separate article, but it is worth mentioning several potential solu-
tions. 
 
 192. The President’s Report, supra note 143, at *32. See also State v. Cain, No. 140 Sept. 
Term 1999, 2000 WL 1036286 (Md. July 28, 2000) (recounting that, in that case, the Clay-
ton County, Georgia, authorities would not investigate a matter where the victim was from 
Maryland and the check at issue was not cashed in Clayton County). 
 193. Id. at 32–33. As the Working Group Report put it: 
[T]he enforcement of state electronic surveillance orders can also be a challenge. 
The Internet and modern satellite communications have made it more necessary for 
state wiretap orders to be served on and enforced against an out-of-state service pro-
vider. Unfortunately, no legal mechanism exists that would allow this. For example, 
drug traffickers operating entirely in New York, but using satellite telephones with 
signals that are received at a ground station outside of New York, potentially are 
completely immune from a New York wiretap order if the out-of-state ground sta-
tion refuses to comply with a New York court’s wiretap order. 
Id. 
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1. The need for an interstate compact on the enforcement of 
investigative subpoenas 
States should consider whether a new interstate compact must be 
reached defining the procedures through which one state court’s in-
vestigative subpoena could be given force within the boundaries of 
another state. Precedent for such a compact exists in the form of the 
Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without a 
State in Criminal Proceedings.194 It may be that minor amendments 
could be made to this agreement which would serve to significantly 
address the problem. A similar approach might also be effective in 
addressing the issue of giving effect to out-of-state electronic surveil-
lance orders. 
2. State legislation requiring acceptance of out-of-state service of 
process 
In order to address the problem of gathering evidence from out-
of-state service providers, some states have adopted, or are consider-
ing adopting, a state statute requiring ISP’s doing business within 
the state to accept and comply with the legal process from other state 
courts, and further requiring the resident agent of any out-of-state 
ISP registered to do business within the state to comply with process 
from forum state courts upon service of the resident agent.195 This 
approach is relatively new and remains untested in the courts, but it 
clearly addresses lowering the hurdles that state courts currently face 
when needing to obtain records from an out-of-state service pro-
vider.196 
 
 194. See generally UNIFORM LAWS ANNOTATED 9–79 (2000) (“Table of Jurisdictions 
Listing Uniform Acts Adopted”). This law allows for the production of material witnesses in 
prosecutions or grand jury investigations that have commenced or are “about to commence.” 
The statute speaks in terms of witnesses to “attend and testify” and further requires a showing 
that the witness is “material and necessary.” Although this statute could apparently be used to 
compel attendance by record witnesses in states that use grand jury investigations or in cases 
where the prosecution is imminent, it does not appear to be helpful in strictly investigatory 
situations, where no grand jury is being used, and charges are not about to be filed. 
 195. Effective January 2000, California amended its Corporations and Penal Codes to 
require California ISPs to accept out-of-state process, and resident agents of nonresident ISPs 
to accept California process. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1524.2 (West 1995); CAL. CORP. CODE 
§ 2105 (West 1990). 
 196. See Reno Remarks of January 10, 2000, supra note 2. Attorney General Reno refer-
enced California’s efforts in her speech to NAAG as well, stating: 
We need to develop an enforceable legal process. We should also consider possible 
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3. “Maxing-out” extraterritorial jurisdiction statutes 
In addition to adopting more effective ways to gather evidence, 
states should examine their state statutes and consider ways to maxi-
mize their reach to ensure the ability to exercise jurisdiction over the 
person of the defendant. With respect to state long-arm statutes, at a 
minimum states can make certain that their long-arm statutes are co-
extensive with the limits of constitutional due process. State civil en-
forcement actions will still face the requirements of the Supreme 
Court’s minimum contacts and purposeful availment jurisprudence, 
but at a minimum they can ensure that their own long-arm statutes 
are not less inclusive than the Constitution would allow. 
With respect to statutes defining extraterritorial criminal jurisdic-
tion, states should consider examining their statutes to determine 
whether they allow for jurisdiction to be exercised in the broadest 
possible way consistent with the Constitution. Many state statutes 
require that either an element of the crime, or a result of the crime 
which is an element, occur in the forum state. The Strassheim analy-
sis suggests that jurisdiction would be permissible if a defendant 
commits a crime intentionally causing detrimental effects (whether 
an element or not) within in the state. The open question remains 
whether a state could adopt legislation authorizing jurisdiction in 
cases where (1) the detrimental effects of a crime occur in the state 
but are not an element; and (2) there is no requirement of showing 
the intent of the defendant to direct his action toward the forum  
state.197 In light of the case law discussed previously, such a statute 
 
legislative solutions. One example would be a state law requiring service providers to 
accept service of process and comply with out-of-state subpoenas, court orders and 
search warrants. I understand that California has adopted legislation in this area, and 
I encourage you to consider whether it would be helpful in your state. 
Id. 
 197. A possible “maximum reach territorial jurisdictional statute” might be structured as 
follows: 
Section 1: It is the policy of this State to exercise jurisdiction over crimes and per-
sons charged with the commission of crime to the fullest extent allowable under, 
and consistent with, the United States Constitution and the Constitution of this 
State. 
Section 2: In accordance with this policy, a person shall be subject to prosecution in 
this State for an offense he/she commits while he/she is physically located either 
within or outside the State, and: 
(1) He/she commits a criminal offense wholly or partly within the State; 
(2) The offender’s conduct committed wholly outside the State constitutes an 
attempt to commit a criminal offense within the State; 
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would give states the maximum reach possible.  
B.  The Masked Man and the Disappearing Trail: Anonymity and 
Traceability on the Internet 
As any burglar with a stocking over his face knows, criminals pre-
fer anonymity because they prefer not getting caught.198 The Inter-
net permits users to remain anonymous both because they can use 
false screen names and registration information, and because it is 
possible to obscure or falsify the originating location of an electronic 
communication.199 Although some anonymity has always been possi-
ble in communications, anonymous Internet communications create 
 
(3) The offender’s conduct committed wholly outside the State constitutes a 
conspiracy to commit an offense within the State, and an act in furtherance of 
the conspiracy was committed within the State, either directly or indirectly by 
the offender, at his/her instigation, or by another member of the conspiracy; 
or 
(4) Any victim of the criminal offense, as defined in [state statute], or any em-
ployee or agent of a governmental unit posing as a victim, resides in the State 
or was located in the State at the time the criminal offense was committed; or 
(5) The criminal offense produces substantial and detrimental effects within the 
State. 
Section 3: An offense is committed partly within this State when: 
(1) An act constituting an element of the offense is committed within the 
State; or 
(2) The result or consequences of an act constituting an element of an offense 
occurs within the State; or 
(3) The offense produces consequences which have a materially harmful impact 
upon the system of government or the community welfare of the State, or re-
sults in the defrauding or harming of persons within the State. 
This proposal was drafted primarily by Assistant Attorneys General Thomas Wheeker and Mat-
thew Keck of the Michigan Department of Attorney General. 
 198. See Kent Alexander & Scott Charney, Computer Crime, 45 EMORY L.J. 931, 943 
(1996). 
 199. See The President’s Report, supra note 145, at 22–23. For a technical explanation of 
a variety of ways that the Internet allows for user anonymity, see EDWARD G. AMOROSO, 
INTRUSION DETECTION: AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNET SURVEILLANCE, CORRELATION, 
TRACE BACK, TRAPS, AND RESPONSE (1999) (Chapter Five: Internet Identity and Anonym-
ity). See also Reno Remarks of January 10, 2000, supra note 2, at 3.  The Attorney General 
stated: 
It doesn’t take a master hacker to disappear on a network. For example, a hacker can 
leave his communications through a series of anonymous remailers, which advertise 
the fact that they keep no records. Or he can create a few forged e-mail headers with 
easy-to-use tools available on hacker web sites. Or he can use a free trial account or 
two. Even a novice can effectively hide the trail of his communications and do it 
quickly. 
Id. 
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a different kind of impact than anonymous letter writing or phone 
calls. Unlike physical world contacts that result in crimes or action-
able claims, which are usually one-to-one contacts, the Internet cre-
ates an environment where the contacts have been described as 
“one-to-many,” or, perhaps more accurately, one-to-all.200 Even if 
law enforcement is successful in identifying the Internet protocol ad-
dress of a computer used in a crime, there remains the challenge of 
further establishing with certainty the identity of the individual who 
was sitting at the keyboard when the message was sent. 
Related to anonymity is the problem that tracing the source of 
electronic communications over the Internet can be difficult. A 
communication over the Internet can be looped through numerous 
connections, including foreign networks, and can therefore involve a 
large number of service providers in numerous locations, all of which 
may have completely inconsistent internal record-keeping and data 
retention policies.201 Thus the electronic “trail” that law enforcement 
must follow, the logs showing records of connections between com-
puters or the stored electronic copies of e-mail, may be deleted (or 
never be retained) before the investigation even begins. 
The problems of anonymity and traceability are difficult policy is-
sues because they touch on privacy concerns202 and industry prac-
 
 200. See Alexander & Charney, supra note 198, at 943. The authors explain: 
The telephone and mail systems allow predominantly one-to-one communications. 
Although it is possible to call thousands of people anonymously, doing so takes a lot 
of time, not to mention a lot of pocket change. By contrast, the one-to-many nature 
of the Internet alters the scope of communications. 
Id. 
 201. See The President’s Report, supra note 145, at 21. 
For example, a cyberstalker in Brooklyn, New York may send a threatening e-mail to 
a person in Manhattan. If the stalker routes his communication through Argentina, 
France, and Norway before reaching his victim, the New York Police Department 
may have to get assistance from the Office of International Affairs at the Department 
of Justice in Washington, D.C., which, in turn, may have to get assistance from law 
enforcement in (say) Buenos Aires, Paris, and Oslo just to learn that the suspect is in 
New York. In this example, the perpetrator needs no passport and passes through no 
checkpoints as he commits his crime, while law enforcement agencies are burdened 
with cumbersome mechanisms for international cooperation, mechanisms that often 
derail or slow investigations. 
Id. 
 202. Some view the anonymity afforded by Internet communications as crucial to the 
exercise of free expression. Indeed, the American Civil Liberties Union complained about the 
fact that the President’s Working Group Report on Unlawful Conduct on the Internet treated 
anonymity as a “thorny issue,” rather than as a constitutional right. See ACLU Letter to Attor-
ney General Reno (Mar. 8, 2000) <http://www.alcu.org/congress/1030800a.html>; John 
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tices. Nevertheless, there are at least three measures which state gov-
ernments can adopt as positive steps. First, state officials can play a 
positive role in encouraging private ISP’s to develop industry stan-
dards and “best practices” which will emphasize the importance of 
preserving certain categories of electronic records and logs for mini-
mum periods to assist law enforcement in protecting the public.203 
Second, states can seriously commit themselves to mutual assistance 
with one another on computer crime matters. For example, Attorney 
General Reno has called for the establishment of a twenty-
four/seven fifty-state network of points of contact for computer 
crime matters which would provide state-to-state assistance in fast-
breaking cases where the electronic trail might disappear.204 Third, 
state investigators can make use of a provision of federal law which 
requires service providers to “freeze” any electronic records they may 
have that are relevant to a law enforcement request, and preserve the 
records for a ninety-day renewable period, until appropriate legal 
process may be obtained by the state.205 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The revolution of information technology includes all the inno-
vations in software and networking infrastructure, the continuing 
miniaturization and improved performance of microprocessors and 
other hardware and, of course, the mainstream application of the 
 
Schwartz, Online Crime Report Raises Privacy Concerns, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2000, at E1. 
 203. This was the approach taken by President Clinton and representatives of large e-
commerce concerns, when they met in the wake of the denial of service attacks of early Febru-
ary 2000, which incapacitated Yahoo!, eBay, CNN, and several other popular web sites, and 
agreed on the need to develop “best practices” regarding network security measures. Clinton, 
Executives Pledge to Expand Cooperation to Tighten Internet Security, 5 ELECTRONIC COM. L. 
REP. 179 (Feb. 23, 2000); Neil King Jr. & David S. Cloud, Set Standards, Don’t Issue Fiats, 
High Tech Chiefs Tell Clinton, WALL ST. J., Feb. 16, 2000. 
 204. See Reno Remarks of January 10, 2000, supra note 2. 
I come to you today to ask you to join with me to create a strong, permanent net-
work of federal, state and local computer crime experts to do the following: To 
share expertise and information technology, to assist each other 24 hours a day, 
seven days a week, around the clock, to prevent cybercrime wherever possible, and 
to bring those responsible for such crime, when it does occur, to justice . . . . 
Id. 
 205. “(1) In general: A provider of wire or electronic communications services or a re-
mote computing service, upon the request of a governmental entity, shall take all necessary 
steps to preserve records and other evidence in its possession pending the issuance of a court 
order or other process.” 18 U.S.C.§ 2703(f) (1994). 
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Internet as a communication tool of every day life. The impact of 
this revolution on the ability of state governments to enforce their 
laws is still only beginning to be understood. The law has responded 
in the area of civil personal jurisdiction by fitting the new technology 
into the old tests developed over fifty years ago in International Shoe. 
Interestingly, many of the early Supreme Court cases that first 
applied the minimum contacts analysis explicitly noted that the new 
test departed from past jurisprudence because of the technological 
and economic changes of the mid-twentieth century which had al-
tered perceptions of fairness.206 Whether the information technology 
revolution, and all of its attendant impacts on the legal system—
creating the possibility of real-time video cross examination of wit-
nesses who are not physically present, eliminating the need for mas-
sive and slow paper discovery, allowing encyclopedic quantities of 
data to be shared (and searched) in the blink of an eye—will eventu-
ally lead to further refinement of the in personam jurisdiction rules 
can only be a matter of speculation. 
For now, it is clear that the courts will not permit the mere ac-
cessibility of a web site as a basis for exercising personal jurisdiction. 
The Zippo sliding scale test is fast becoming the majority rule. The 
key factors weighing in favor of a finding of jurisdiction will be proof 
of other non-Internet contacts and purposeful availment of the fo-
rum (whether through real world or Internet contacts). 
In criminal cases, a state need not show any minimum contacts 
with the forum, but must comply either with common law standards 
requiring that an offender intentionally cause detrimental effects in 
the forum state, or with the state’s statute articulating the reach of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. Such statutes normally require, for exam-
ple, that an element of the crime occur within the forum state. In ei-
ther case, when a victim is located in the forum state and engages in 
a transaction over the Internet that results in a crime being inten-
tionally committed against the victim, the state will usually be able to 
 
 206. See, e.g., Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 101 (1978) (The “evolving stan-
dards of due process . . . in large part ‘attributable to the . . . increasing nationalization of 
commerce . . . [accompanied by] modern transportation and communication [that] have made 
it much less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State where he engages in eco-
nomic activity.’” (quoting McGee v. Int’l Life Ins., 355 U.S. 220, 222–23 (1957)). See also 
Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250–51 (1958) (“As technological progress has increased 
the flow of commerce between the States, the need for jurisdiction over nonresidents has un-
dergone a similar increase.”). 
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make the case that jurisdiction is appropriate in the state. In com-
mon law states following the Strassheim rule, the most likely defense 
would be that the defendant did not intend to have a detrimental 
impact in the forum state. This will be difficult to sustain in cases 
where the defendant either ships something to the forum state or 
fails to do so after communicating with and accepting payment from 
a forum state resident. 
In both civil and criminal cases, however, the Internet presents a 
variety of challenges for state investigations due to the jurisdictional 
limitations on the extraterritorial enforcement of state subpoenas. 
Possible remedies for these problems include a new inter-state com-
pact, state legislation requiring acceptance of out-of-state service of 
process, and broader jurisdictional statutes. Certain qualities of the 
Internet create disadvantages for law enforcement, such as the bor-
derless nature of the Internet, and the problems of anonymity and 
traceability. Overcoming these hurdles will require intense and sus-
tained levels of cooperation among state governments, between 
them and the federal government, and between the public and the 
private sectors. The value of developing voluntary industry standards 
and “best practices” in these areas to assist law enforcement cannot 
be overestimated. 
From the perspective of state governments charged with enforc-
ing their laws, perhaps the Internet does share some characteristics 
with the old west. It is a vast frontier unbeholden to any one regime 
of laws; a place where individual freedom reigns supreme. Though 
faced with new challenges, states retain their traditional enforcement 
tools, which, they will find, still operate in cyberspace. It remains to 
be seen whether the courts or the legislatures will fashion more effec-
tive tools to ensure that states remain able to fulfill their traditional 
enforcement responsibilities in the Age of the Internet. Regardless of 
such initiatives, however, we have seen that existing law does not 
completely hamstring states from carrying out their duties. As states 
continue to confront cybercrime and e-consumer litigation, they will 
continue to apply pressure in favor of the law’s outward expansion in 
finding new jurisdictional rules. For the same wild west that attracted 
outlaws and renegades also inspired the courage and creativity of 
those who sought to tame it and create a safe and prosperous com-
munity for everyone.207 
 
 207. On March 9, 2000, at a press conference announcing the release of The President’s 
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APPENDIX 
Due Process Allows  
Exercise of Personal 
Jurisdiction 
Due Process MAY Allow  
Exercise of Personal  
Jurisdiction 
Due Process Does NOT 
Allow Exercise of  
Personal Jurisdiction 
Claim arises out of con-
duct involving forum 
(specific jurisdiction) 
-AND- 
Continuous and sys-
tematic or minimum 
contacts 
-OR- 
Purposeful availment of 
forum 
-OR- 
In-forum service of 
process on the person 
-AND- 
Otherwise “reasonable” 
and consistent with 
“traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial 
justice” 
 
Claim does not arise out of 
conduct involving forum 
(general jurisdiction) 
-AND- 
Continuous and systematic 
contacts 
-OR- 
Purposeful availment of fo-
rum 
-OR- 
In-forum service of process 
on the person 
-AND- 
Otherwise “reasonable” and 
consistent with “traditional 
notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice” 
Claim arises out of conduct 
involving forum (specific ju-
risdiction) 
-AND- 
Single or few occurrences of 
conduct 
-AND- 
Otherwise “reasonable” and 
consistent with “traditional 
notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice” 
Claim does NOT arise 
out of conduct involving 
forum (general jurisdic-
tion) 
-AND- 
Single and isolated con-
tact 
-AND- 
No in-state personal ser-
vice 
-AND- 
Not “reasonable” and 
consistent with traditional 
notions of fair play and 
substantial justice” 
Claim arises out of con-
duct involving forum 
(specific jurisdiction) 
-AND- 
Purposeful availment of 
forum 
-AND- 
Not “reasonable” and 
consistent with “tradi-
tional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice” 
 
 
Report, see supra note 145, Attorney General Reno stated: “I think there are still some—
perhaps it’s a little like the Wild West in the development of America—who say, ‘Let’s not let 
the government be involved.’ But there were also the marshals and Wyatt Earp and others who 
brought some order to it.” See also James Vicini, Technology Firms Urged to Help Collar Hack-
ers, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 10, 2000, at 3(3). 
